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Project
An Assessment of Alternative Strategies
for Increasing Access to Legal Services*
Since the late 1930s, lawyers have argued that their services are
not used to the fullest advantage by a large segment of the popula2
tion.' More recently, other concerned groups such as trade unions
and consumer organizations 3 also have become convinced that there
is an underutilization of lawyers' services, and that it is important to
increase access to such services. As a result, attempts have been made
to develop alternatives to the traditional methods of providing legal
services that to date have proved inadequate in meeting the legal
needs of the public. Legal clinics have proliferated, 4 prepaid legal
services plans have been inaugurated on a wide scale,5 and the or* The authors wish to thank their advisor, Professor Stanton A. Wheeler, for his
thoughtful comments, and Associate Dean Edward A. Dauer for his insights and support.
1. See, e.g., Smith, The Bar Association Law Office for Persons of Moderate Means
(Designed for a Large City), 19 B.U. L. Rav. 226, 226 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Bar
Association Law Office]; Address by Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson, Junior Bar
Conference of the American Bar Association (July 9, 1939), excerpts reprinted in Smith,
Legal Service Offices for Persons of Moderate Means, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 416, 425 [hereinafter cited as Legal Services Offices].
2. The recent development of prepaid legal services plans owes much to the efforts
of trade unions. The first modern attempts to organize a closed-panel prepaid plan was
undertaken in 1957 by a restaurant workers union in Los Angeles whose members
were largely Mexican immigrants with unmet legal needs concerning their installment
purchases, debt arrangements, and marital situations. See Cedarquist, Lawyers at the
Crossroads-Professionor Trade? 31 UNAUTH. PRAC. NEws 79, 83 (1965-66). Since that time,
organized labor has expressed a growing interest in helping to broaden union members'
access to legal services. See Bernstein, Legal Services, the Bar and the Unions, 58 A.B.A.J.
472, 473 (1972); Resolution adopted by the 1972 UAW Constitutional Convention, reprinted in Recent Developments in Prepaid Legal Services Plans: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1974) (statement of Leonard P. Woodcock) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
3. See, e.g., NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICEs 409 (1972) (held in Washington, D.C., April 27-29, 1972) (report of Helen Nelson) (consumer representatives agree
that consumers have great unmet need for legal services) [hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON
CONFERENCE]; DeMent, Legal Services Dilemma: View from the Market, TRIAL, Aug. 1976,
at 26 (consumer groups believe that significant segment of moderate income population
lacks access to lawyers' services because of structure of profession).
4. See Slavin, Lawyers and Madison Avenue, BARRsTR, Summer 1979, at 47 (number
of clinics expanded from 12 to more than 200 since 1977).
5. See Murphy, Prepaid Taking Root, TRIAL, June 1976, at 14-15 (describing growth
of prepaid plans); Paying less for a lawyer, 44 CONSuMER REtP. 522, 526 (estimating that
5 million families are covered by prepaid plans).
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ganized bar has attempted to revitalize its lawyer referral services. 6
All of this has been done, however, without a complete understanding
of why people do or do not use lawyers.
This Project examines factors said to affect utilization of legal services by analyzing the results of a national survey conducted between
1973 and 1974 by the Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs of
the American Bar Association and the American Bar Foundation
(ABA-ABF Survey).7 This analysis reveals that lawyer use depends
principally upon three factors-the number of times a person has experienced a legal problem, whether a person owns real property, and
whether a person has personal contacts with a lawyer. These findings
are then used to evaluate the potential of several alternative legal
delivery systems for increasing lawyer use. The Project concludes that
closed-panel prepaid plans and legal clinics have the greatest potential for increasing lawyer use, though both may have only a limited
impact.
I.

The Emerging Concern About Underutilization of Lawyers

The legal profession has become increasingly concerned with the
unmet legal needs of the public. Several types of alternative legal
delivery systems have been devised to meet these needs. Unfortunately,
knowledge of determinants of lawyer use is insufficiently developed
to permit effective evaluation of these alternatives.
A.

A History of Increasing Concern

Until the early 1930s discussion of the unmet need for legal services had focused primarily on the legal needs of the poor who were
unable to obtain legal services on the customary fee-for-service basis.8
6. The primary focus of attempts to rejuvenate lawyer referral services has been the
promulgation of a new Statement of Standards and Practices for a Lawyer Referral
Service by the ABA. See Carlin, The Advancing State of the Art of Lawyer Referral
Setvice, 30 BAYLOR L. REv. 643, 648-51 (1978) (description of new standards).
7. The American Bar Foundation provided the raw data for this Project. The results of the survey are reported in B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977).
The description of the data files and the index to their contents are set forth in B.
CURRAN & K. RosicH, DATA MANUAL FOR THE SURVEY OF LEGAL NEEDS (1980).
The survey yielded an extensive data base that contains the most complete information on the incidence of legal problems and patterns of lawyer use ever compiled. Pre%ious surieys of legal needs were either not based on representative samples or were
restricted to one geographical area. See B. CURRAN, supra, at 2-9. The ABA-ABF Survey
is the first survey of legal needs using a national sample. Id. at 1.
8. Perhaps the most important work in drawing attention to the unmet legal needs
of the poor was Reginald Heber Smith's Justice and the Poor. Smith toured the nation's
legal aid societies and courts, and concluded from this study that, "[tihe administration
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Legal aid societies were organized in many cities in an effort to meet
this need, 9 in part out of the belief that providing legal services to
the poor was necessary to prevent violent social upheaval. 10
In the 1930s, however, the view emerged that the segment of the
population underserved by the legal profession was far broader, encompassing many persons of moderate means, as well as the poor."
This view was doubtlessly enhanced by the serious economic hard12
ships faced by the profession as a result of the Great Depression.
During this period Dean Charles E. Clark of the Yale Law School
and sociologist Emma Corstvet conducted the first survey of lawyer use. 13 They concluded that "[t]he lawyers' earnings are low, and
there is a great deal of legal work undone which might become what
u4
the economists call 'effective demand' under other conditions.'
TIhis new interest in unmet legal needs stimulated calls for change
in the traditional means of delivering legal services. Professor Karl
of American justice is not impartial, the rich and poor do not stand on an equality
before the law, the traditional method of providing justice has operated to close the
doors of the courts to the poor, and has caused a gross denial of justice in all parts of
the country to millions of persons." R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (1919). Publication of Smith's work sparked considerable controversy, and gave greater impetus to
the legal aid movement in the United States. See E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE
FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 5-8 (1974).
9. At the turn of the century legal aid societies increased dramatically in number
from the Deutscher Rechts-Schutz Verein founded in 1876 to protect poor German
immigrants, to the 61 societies that in 1923 handled 150,000 cases. See J. AUERBACH,
UNEQUAL JUSTICE 53-58 (1976). Legal aid did not enjoy comparable growth again until the
1950s when the threat of a government financed national legal aid plan encouraged
many state and local bar associations to support legal aid. See E. JOHNSON, supra note
8, at 9.
10. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 58 (fear of unrest accounted for growth of
legal aid). Indeed, even as late as 1950 some supporters of legal aid were still touting
it as a cost-effective way of avoiding the "powder keg" of "alien subversive doctrines." See
Holtze, Legal Aid Societies Have Become a Vital Part of the Processes of Justice in Nation,
19 HENNEPIN LAW. 27, 27 (1950).
11. See Bradway, The Bar Association Law Office for Persons of Moderate Means (In
a Non-Metropolitan Area), in THE ECONOMICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 133, 134-35 (1938)
(persons of moderate means in rural areas are in need of legal service, but do not obtain
it); Bar Association Law Office, supra note 1, at 226 (huge class of persons of moderate
means need legal help, but cannot find it); Address by Solicitor General Robert H. Jackson,
supra note I (bar leaves persons who are neither well-to-do nor poor largely unserved).
12. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 204 ("It took the Depression to provoke concern [for the unmet legal needs of lower- and middle-income people], less because people needed lawyers than because so many lawyers desperately needed clients."); Legal
Services Offices, supra note 1, at 425 (bar's alarm at economic plight of members led
to awareness of problem of unmet legal need).
13. The Clark and Corstvet study consisted of a survey of 412 residents and 61 small
businesses in New Haven, Connecticut. The respondents came from wards primarily made
up of lower and middle income groups. A separate survey was also made of 50 lawyers.
The results of the survey appear in Clark & Corstvet, The Lawyer and the Public: An
A.A.L.S. Survey, 47 YALE L.J. 1272 (1938).
14. Id. at 1293.

124
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N. Llewellyn proposed that bar associations establish neighborhood
law offices to provide limited advice and to refer clients to competent
lawyers willing to perform standardized services for a sliding scale
fee according to the client's income. 15 Llewellyn further recommended
that the availability of such lawyers be publicized through institutional advertising. 6 Other commentators joined in the call for creation
of neighborhood legal services offices specializing in providing lowcost legal services to persons of moderate means.' 7 Although a few
offices were established along these lines,' calls for reform remained
largely unheeded by the organized bar.' 9
After World War II commentators continued to focus attention
on the unmet need for legal services. 20 During this period, a study
conducted by Professor Earl L. Koos provided further empirical support for the proposition that large segments of the population were
underserved by lawyers. 21 This survey of working class and middle
class families concluded that such families generally lacked the ser15. Llewellyn's proposals are set forth in Llewellyn, The Bar Specializes-With What
Results? 167 ANNALS 177, 191-92 (1933) [hereinafter cited as The Bar Specializes], and
Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures? 5 LAw & CONTEMPI. PROB. 104,
122-25 (1938) [hereinafter cited as The Bar's Troubles).
16. Llewellyn carefully limited his proposal to support for institutional advertising
by the bar. He did not endorse advertising by individual lawyers. See The Bar's Troubles,
supra note 15, at 122.
17. See, e.g., Bradway, Low-Cost Legal Service Bureaus, 17 N.C. L. REv. 101, 116-17
(1938); Bar Association Law Office, supra note 1, at 229. The idea of low-cost neighborhood law offices received an enthusiastic response from young urban lawyers. J. AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 207.
18. The National Lawyers Guild (Guild) was instrumental in implementing the idea
of low-cost neighborhood law offices. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 207. In Chicago,
Guild members established a centralized office to provide legal services to persons of
moderate means. See Proposal for a Legal Service Bureau for the Metropolitan Area of
Chicago, 1 NAT'L LAw. GuoeD Q. 149 (1938) (describing proposed Chicago bureau). In
Philadelphia, the Guild established a series of neighborhood legal services offices scattered throughout the city. See Abrahams, The Neighborhood Law Office Experiment,
9 U. CHi. L. REv. 406, 411-12 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Law Office Experiment]. The
Philadelphia experiment proved quite successful, with most offices becoming at least
self-sustaining, and one office clearing more than $15,000 in a year. See Abrahams, The
Neighborhood Law Office Plan, 1949 Wis. L. Rxv. 634, 639-40.
19. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 207; Law Office Experiment, supra note 18,
at 407.
20. One bar official asserted that "[t]he creation of adequate facilities which will
assure competent legal advice and assistance to the millions of persons of moderate
means has emerged as one of the greatest post-war problems confronting the organized
bar." Legal Services Offices, supra note 1, at 416. Concern about unmet legal needs was
stimulated by the fear that the failure to meet such needs might induce government,
labor unions, or other institutions to encroach further on the bar's historical prerogatives
in providing legal services. See Legal Services Policies, 32 A.B.A.J. 866 (1946).
21. Koos surveyed working-class and middle-class families in six cities in three geographic regions. Middle-class surveys were done by mail, while working-class respondents
were surveyed through personal interviews. The results of the study appear in E. Koos,
THE FAMILY AND THE LAw (1952).
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vices of a lawyer in meeting problems best solved with a lawyer's assistance.2 2 In terms of actual reform, however, this era was less fruitful. In 1946, the American Bar Association (ABA) did endorse the
use of lawyer referral services, 23 but actively opposed other proposed
innovations such as group legal services.2 4
During the last twenty years the delivery of legal services has changed
dramatically with respect to the legal needs of the poor. In Gideon
v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court held that an indigent person accused of a serious crime had a constitutional right to
the assistance of counsel.2 5 With respect to civil matters, the federal
government created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
Legal Services Program to fund the development of a wide range of
20
programs providing legal services to the poor on a national scale.
Important strides also were made in implementing such innovations
as prepaid legal services plans and legal advertising. Beginning in
the 1960s, trade unions won a series of court battles that established
their constitutional right to retain attorneys to provide personal legal
services to their members.2 7 Under considerable pressure from the
courts, Congress, and unions, the organized bar gradually revised its
22.
23.

Id. at 12.
The first lawyer referral service office was opened in Los Angeles in 1937. B.

CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR THE PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS

176 (1970). The service

received

the endorsement of the ABA House of Delegates in 1946. 71 A.B.A. REP. 109-10 (1946).
24. The ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics had long proscribed the provision of
group legal services and closed-panel prepaid plans. In 1928, Canon 35 was adopted,
prohibiting an attorney from accepting employment from an organization if such employment included the rendering of legal services to the members of the organization in
respect to their individual affairs. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 35 (1928).
Some forms of prepaid plans were permitted, but only if they specifically offered to pay
for any attorney the member employed. See, e.g., In re Thibodeau, 295 Mass. 374, 378-79,
3 N.E.2d 749, 751 (1936).
When interest in group legal services and closed-panel prepaid plans increased in the
late 1950s, bar association opposition to such schemes was renewed. See, e.g., Cedarquist,
supra note 2, at 92-95; Committee on Group Legal Services, Group Legal Services, 34
J. ST. B. CAL. 318, 339-43 (1959).
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (constitutional right to assistance of counsel in felony prosecutions). The subsequent decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), extended
the rule of Gideon to hold that no indigent defendant may be constitutionally deprived
of liberty if he was denied the assistance of counsel.
26. See E. JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 37-70 (describing development of OEO Legal
Services Program).
27. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (union plan
designed to retain moderately priced attorneys in Federal Employers Liability Act actions
held permissible); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967)
(union's hiring of attorneys on salary basis to process members' workmen's compensation
claims held permissible); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (union's recommendation of attorneys to its members in personal
injury cases protected under First and Fourteenth Amendments).

126
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ethical restrictions on the growth of prepaid plans, 28 at first to permit
such plans only to the extent required by constitutional interpretations of the courts, 29 and later to permit broader use of both closedand open-panel prepaid plans.3 0 The growth of prepaid plans was
also encouraged by amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act that permitted unions to bargain collectively for prepaid legal services as a
fringe benefit of employment, 31 and by amendments to the Internal
Revenue Code that afforded such benefits favorable tax treatment.3 2
Further innovations in the delivery of legal services resulted from
the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar of
A rizona,33 which struck down a state's blanket ban on attorney advertising as an unconstitutional abridgment of commercial speech. The
Bates decision led directly to a proliferation of low-cost legal clinics
that provide standardized legal services. 34
At the same time that innovations in the delivery of legal services
were finally achieving actual implementation after years of academic
discussion, concern about the legal needs of the public led to the most
ambitious study of legal needs yet undertaken. In 1971, an ABA
House of Delegates resolution directed that a nationwide survey be
conducted "to ascertain the extent to which the public recognizes the
need for and uses legal services. ' 35 The survey found that respondents
28. When the ABA sought to retain ethical restrictions on closed-panel prepaid plans,
groups operating prepaid plans threatened to sue the ABA for violation of the antitrust
laws and infringement of First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See L. DEITCH & D.
WEINSTEIN, PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 22 (1976). Hearings were held by the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Representation of Citizen Interests, during which several witnesses
attacked the bar's position. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 5-7, 19-21, 98 (testimony of
Stephen Schlossberg, Robert J. Connerton, and Bruce B. Wilson).
29. The new Code of Professional Responsibility adopted in 1969 permitted nonprofit
organizations to recommend, furnish, or pay for legal services to their members, but
only to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretations required the allowance of
such activities. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-103(D)(5)
(1969).
30. In 1975, the ABA amended the Code of Professional Responsibility to permit
operation of both closed-panel and open-panel prepaid plans, provided that seven relatively non-restricti e requirements are met. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
DISCIPLINARY RULE 2-103(D)(5) (1976).
31. Labor Management Relations Act Amendments of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-95, 87
Stat. 314 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (1976)).
32. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2134(b), (e), 90 Stat. 1520 (codified
at I.R.C. §§ 120, 501(c)(20)). Under the new Internal Revenue Code provisions an emplojer may deduct contributions made to a prepaid plan, and neither the employer's
contribution nor services received by employees under the plan are taxed as income to
the employees. I.R.C. §§ 120(a)(1), (2), 501(c)(20).
33. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
34. See Bodine, Proliferation of Legal Clinics Continues; 550 More Were Born in Last
10 Months, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 31, 1979, at 5; Slavin, supra note 4, at 47.
35. 96 A.B.A. REP. 143-44 (1971).
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encountered an average of five selected situations presenting potential
legal problems, 36 but that one-third had never used a lawyer and another third had used a lawyer only onceY1 This seeming incongruity
between incidence of legal problems and actual lawyer use led many
commentators to conclude that a large unmet legal need existed among
38
the general public.
B.

Three Alternative Legal Delivery Systems

During the past fifteen years, three alternative legal delivery systems-lawyer referral services (LRSs), prepaid legal service plans, and
legal clinics-have grown in part as a response to increasing concern
about unmet legal need. 39
1. Lawyer Referral Services
Lawyer referral services confer with those wishing to consult an
attorney. ABA standards require the LRS person "screening" the
request for an attorney to be an attorney 40 but many LRS offices do not
conform to the standards. In addition, not all LRSs provide for a
screening interview. 4 1 The capacity of an LRS to conduct an effective
screening interview is limited by the number of staff lawyers employed
by the LRS. 42 After this initial interview, the LRS refers the caller

to an attorney on its list of participating lawyers. 43 The potential
36. B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 100. The precise mean number of legal problems
per respondent was 4.8. Nearly a third of the sample had encountered six or more legal
problems during their lives. Id. at 100.
37. Id. at 185-86, 190.
88. See, e.g., Carlin, supra note 6, at 643-45; Zander, How to Explain the Unmet Need
for Legal Services, 64 A.B.A.J. 1676 (1978).
39. Other alternatives have been suggested, including expanded use of lawyer lists
and lawyer directories, see Christensen, Toward Improved Legal Services Delivery: A
Look at Four Mechanisms, 1979 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 277, 285-89, and private referral services, see ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, LEGAL
SERVICES FOR THE AVERAGE

CITIZEN 17-18 (1977)

[hereinafter cited as AVERAGE

CITIZEN].

These alternatives have yet to receive widespread attention or be implemented on a
large scale, and therefore are not analyzed in this Project.
40. Carlin, supra note 6, at 648-51. These standards of the ABA Lawyer Referral
Standing Committee are hortatory only; the Committee has no control over local referral
services. Id. at 648.
41. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 174.
42. See Carlin, supra note 6, at 651 (in 1975 only 12% of LRSs reported having staff
attorney).
43. Some referral services give the client the names of three attorneys from which to
choose. See Christensen, supra note 39, at 289. Others have panels of attorneys who
specialize in a particular field of law. Licensed attorneys usually join an LRS list merely
by volunteering, without undergoing extensive screening. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note
23, at 178. But see Murphy, Lawyer Reference Plan-The Complete Delivery System for
Legal Services, in LEGAL DELIVERY SYSTrMS: AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 247, 255-57 (1977)
(Chicago Bar Association uses extensive screening for LRS panel applicants).
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client then makes an appointment to meet with the attorney at a
nominal fee, usually between fifteen and twenty-five dollars. 44 After
the initial consultation, the lawyer and client are free to establish any
fee arrangement that is mutually agreeable. 4 Lawyer referral services,
generally sponsored by local bar associations, have constituted the
organized bar's principal effort to increase access to lawyers during
4
the last forty years.

6

2.

PrepaidLegal Services Plans
Prepaid legal services plans, a more recent phenomenon, 4 7 seek to
spread the risk of legal difficulty and the cost of legal services over a
group of persons. 48 Prepaid plans, though appearing in many forms, 49
can be generally categorized as either open- or closed-panel arrangements. 50
Open-panel prepaid legal insurance plans insure members for fixed
amounts of legal services during specified time periods. 5 1 Open-panel
44. Berg, Lawyer Referral Services, in ABA, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS 1,
3 (1979).
45. Id. About one-half of all referrals do not go beyond the initial consultation stage.
Haydock, Lawyer Referral in New York, in LEGAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS: AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 279, 282 (1977).
46. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 173, 176. In 1978, there were 294 referral
services, and the 188 services that responded to a survey reported receiving 919,464 requests for assistance and making 610,928 referrals. Christensen, supra note 39, at 286 n.33.
47. The first prepaid legal services plan actually appeared as early as 1889. Delk,
The Advent of Prepaid Legal Services in North Carolina, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 271,
274 (1977). The North Carolina and similar plans, however, did not succeed because of
opposition from the organized bar. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 13-17;
Delk, supra, at 274-75. More recently, under pressure from the Supreme Court, Congress,
and trade unions, the ABA decided to liberalize its ethical restrictions on participation
in prepaid plans. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 17-23.
48. See W. PFENNiSTORF, LEGAL EXPENSE INSURANcE 2 (1975). There are currently
more than 2,000 prepaid plans operating nationally, see DeMent, Prepaid Legal Services:
A Review of Theory and Practice, 30 BAYLOR L. REV. 625, 635 (1978), covering more
than five million families, see Paying less for a lawyer, supra note 5, at 526.
49. For discussions of the variety of prepaid legal services plans, see Broadman &
Ohman, New Directions in Legal Services: Group and Prepaid Legal Services Plans in
New York, in LEGAL DELIVERY SYSrEMs: AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 107, 117-43 (1977); Ohman,
,n Overview of Five Legal Service Plans, 2 NEw DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 5 (1977);
Comment, Prepaid Legal Services: Obstacles Hampering Its Growth and Development, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 841, 843-57 (1979).
50. Some plans may combine elements of the open- and closed-panel arrangements.
See Goodman, Development of PrepaidLegal Services Plans, in ABA, LEGAL SERVICES FOR
THE MIDDLE CLASS 15, 19 (1979).
51. Open-panel plans exhibit a variety of benefits and coverage. Some plans limit
coverage to a percentage of fees charged for specified types of services. See, e.g., Broadman
& Ohman, supra note 49, at 136-37 (benefit schedule for New York County Legal Services
Corporation Prepaid Legal Services Plan). Others state coverage in terms of a certain
number of hours of legal work per year. See, e.g., Ellis, An Overview of Prepaid Legal
Services-Open Panel, in LEGAL DELIVERY SYsTEMS: AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 145, 153-54
(1977).

HeinOnline -- 90 Yale L.J. 129 1980-1981

The Yale Law Journal

Vol. 90: 122, 1980

plans have been sponsored primarily by bar associations but also by
general third-party insurers 52 and employers53 or employee organizationsY4 With an open-panel plan, the insured selects his own attorney
and the insurer pays the attorney directly for his services. The bar
has consistently supported the open-panel concept rather than closed
panels, in part, because of the importance of choice in selecting an
attorney. 55 However, the bar's opposition to closed panels may also
have been motivated by considerations of self-interest. 56
Closed-panel plans are sponsored by groups that retain a law firm
or hire their own legal staffs to deal with many legal problems common to their covered members. Any group can sponsor a prepaid plan.
Thus far plans have been sponsored by trade unions,5 7 teachers' associations,58 consumer cooperatives,59 and student organizations and
schools. 0 Reformers have preferred closed-panel plans over open-panel
plans. 6 ' Closed-panel plans typically cover members only when they
use the services of the retained staff or law firm. Although the member's freedom of choice is thus somewhat restricted, commentators
have identified several advantages of closed panels, among them better
quality control, lower cost, and greater lawyer contact. 62
Both closed- and open-panel plans enable the insured to budget
52. WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 118 (remarks of William DeBuse) (prepaid plan open to general public); DeMent, supra note 48, at 636-37 (insurance companies
initially deterred from offering prepaid due to perceived low potential for profit but
now showing greater interest); Murphy, supra note 5, at 15 (two insurance companies
offering open-panel prepaid but limited to discrete groups).
53. Open-panel plans often result from the joint efforts of employer and employee
groups through collective bargaining agreements. More than 60 such arrangements existed
in 1976. Usually, the employer contributes between 4 and 15 cents per worker hour to
a joint fund for legal expenses while workers contribute between 3 and 10 cents per
hour to the fund. Murphy, supra note 5, at 14-15. Employers appear not to have sponsored prepaid plans on their own. L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 36-37.
54. The Shreveport plan, begun in 1971 and considered by some the "first plan in
the United States that offered substantial coverage of personal legal problems to the
working man," was an open-panel plan covering union members. Murphy, supra note 5,
at 14. See also F. MARKS, THE SHREVEPORT PLAN (1974).
55. See Keating, What You Always Wanted to Know About Prepaid Legal Services,
57 MICH. ST. B.J. 18, 21-22 (1978).
56. See Hermann, Prepaid Legal Services Coming of Age, 48 N.Y. ST. B.J. 438, 442-43
(1976). Bar discussion of prepaid plans has frequently involved a mix of public-interest
and private-gain considerations. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 55, at 25 (both public's
interest and lawyers' interests should be considered when discussing prepaid plans).
57. See Ohman, supra note 49, at 5.
58. See Ohman, NEA Eyes Future of Prepaid and Group, 3 NEw DIRECTIONs IN LEGAL
SERVICES 20, 20 (1978).
59. See FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES 89-90 (1975) (held in
New Orleans, La., May 8-10, 1975) (remarks of Harriet Thayer).
60. See Adams, Student Legal Service Plans: A Fast-Growing Service on College Campuses, 4 NEw DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 3, 3 (1979).
61. See DeMent, supra note 48, at 633-34.
62. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 41; Ellis, supra note 51, at 148
(better cost and quality control); pp. 151-52 infra (greater lawyer contact and lower costs).
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legal expenses and spread the risk of incurring major legal expenses
across a large number of people. 63 Another advantage common to
both closed- and open-panel plans is the lower cost of fee collection.
These savings can be passed on to consumers, decreasing the overall
64
cost of providing legal services.

3.

Legal Clinics

The third popular form of alternative legal services delivery, legal
clinics, 5 are law firms designed to serve clients with routine legal
problems. Routine legal problems are those that usually can be handled in the same way each time, such as uncontested divorces, simple
wills, nonbusiness bankruptcies, and residential property transactions. 6
Many clinics specialize only in routine services. 67 Some, however,
perform such nonroutine services as personal injury litigation. 8 Legal
clinics, on average, charge lower fees than traditional law firms69 and
rely on extensive advertising to attract the large clientele such opera70
tions require.
C.

Proposed Determinants of Lawyer Use

There exists no well-developed theory of lawyer use. 71 In reviewing
the literature of legal need and legal service delivery methods, one
63.

See B.

64.

See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 74.

CHRISTENSEN,

supra note 23, at 65-66.

65. Barlow Christensen rekindled modern interest in the legal clinic concept first
developed by Llewellyn. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 205. The first law firm
to use the name legal clinic was The Legal Clinic of Jacoby & Meyers in Los Angeles,
established in 1972. Maron, Legal Clinics: A Status Report, in LEGAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS:
AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 239, 241 (1977). Although there were only 12 clinics in 1977
prior to the decision in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down
flat ban on attorney advertising), there are now an estimated 700 clinics, including numerous branches of the same clinic, see Bodine, supra note 34, at 5.
66. See Muris & McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services:
The Case for Clinics, 1979 Ama. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 179, 192.
67. See Draznin, Legal Clinics: Illegitimate Children of Permissive Advertising Rules,
in ABA, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS 28-29 (1979).
68. See, e.g., Meyers, Legal Clinics: Their Theory and How They Work, 52 L.A.B.J.
106, 107 (1976) (Jacoby & Meyers' fee schedule for personal injury cases). But see Stark,
Jacoby &' Meyers Charges More Than Wall Street, Ams. LAW., Aug. 1979, at 1, col. 1-2
(field study indicating that clinics may not deal effectively with nonroutine problems).
69. See D. MARON, LEGAL CLINICS: ANALYSIS AND SURVEY 8 (2d ed. 1977); Muris &
McChesney, supra note 66, at 195-96.
70. See Meyers, supra note 68, at 107; Muris & McChesney, supra note 66, at 183.
71. One author notes that little is known about the process of obtaining a lawyer,
les than what is known about the process of using medical services. "A number of factors influence how clients come to perceive problems as amenable to legal assistance.
These are certain psychological, cultural, and social attributes whose operation in law
is less well understood than it is in medicine." Ladinsky, The Traffic in Legal Services:
Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the Channeling of Clients, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 207, 207
(1976).
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commentator observed that a "striking feature" of the area is "the
sparseness of the literature difectly on point. ' 7 2 Commentators who
discuss the subject simply point out particular factors that arguably
affect whether a person uses an attorney in a given situation.3 All
too often such statements are supported by personal observations or
accepted wisdom but lack a thorough theoretical basis.7 4 Only rarely
does empirical evidence support the pronouncement of conventional
75
wisdom.
Despite the lack of a well-developed theory, however, the literature
does include seven factors that, according to different commentators,
significantly affect a person's decision to use a lawyer. Each explanatory factor rests on its own assumptions. An adequate examination
of use of lawyers' services must test each of these factors.
Some commentators have argued that disposable income determines
use of legal services-that is, that persons with higher income tend
to use more legal services.7 6 This explanation assumes that conven72. Lempert, Mobilizing PrivateLaw: An Introductory Essay, 11 LAw & Soc'" REV. 173,
176 (1976) (discussing Marks, Some Research Perspectives for Looking at Legal Need and
Legal Delivery Systems: Old Forms or New? 11 LAW & Soc'y Rv. 191 (1976)).
73. See, e.g., Sklodowski & Rathe, Aid For The Middle Class: Deduction of Legal
Expenses, CASE & COMMENT, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 40. The article primarily advocates a
personal income tax deduction for legal expenses modeled after the existing medical
expense deduction. Before advancing this proposal, the authors note, without supporting
citations, that "[t]here are two important reasons why so many people fail to make use
of an attorney. The first reason is simple ignorance . . . . Secondly, the cost of legal
assistance deters many from the use of an attorney. Whether or not it is based on
fact, there is a widespread belief that legal help is always expensive." Id. at 40.
74. The history of concern discussed above largely rested on intuition. One author's
1968 observation remains accurate:
There is no direct evidence that the middle class needs more legal service than
it is presently getting. Citations can be collected stating that there is a need, but
the sources cite each other, not broad, careful empirical research. Indubitably, many
people think there is an unfilled need, and a persuasive case can perhaps be developed from reflecting about the growth and problems of modern society.
Stolz, Insurance for Legal Services: A Preliminary Study of Feasibility, 35 U. CHI. L. REv.
417, 419 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
75. One author concludes that "It]here has been little empirical investigation of
the ways in which individuals are linked to providers of legal services ..
" Lempert,
supra note 72, at 176. Another notes that evaluation of the suggested factors affecting
lawyer use "will have to await more empirical research in the delivery of legal services."
Ladinsky, supra note 71, at 209.
Some empirical studies have been based on such small localized samples that they
more closely resemble intuitive essays. See, e.g., Frierson, Legal Advertising-Can It Be
a Life Preserver for the Profession? BARRISTER, Winter 1975, at 6 (author, on basis of
questions administered to 40 residents in one locality, found that public grossly overestimates cost of routine legal services). The majority opinion in Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977), cited the Frierson study with approval. An exception to
the usual lack of empirical research is Mayhew & Reiss, The Social Organization of Legal
Contacts, 34 Am. Soc. REv. 309 (1969), which reports extensive survey data results.
76. See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317, 1334-40 (1964); Carlin, Howard, & Messinger, Civil Justice and the Poor, I LA-w &
Soc'Y REv. 9, 26, 55 (1966).
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tional theories of market behavior apply to the purchase of legal
services. 77 Although some members of the bar, principally those opposed to advertising by attorneys, 7 have argued that lawyers and
clients do not behave as producers and consumers do in a normal
market exchange, 79 many scholars have disputed this view.8 0 Though
regulated, restricted in its entry, and less understood by the consumer
than other markets, the legal services market nevertheless involves an
exchange of compensation for services. There exist many suppliers of
such services."' It seems reasonable that consumers will choose among
these suppliers based on their needs, resources, and information de82
spite some systemic barriers to completely free consumer choice.
There are two versions of the disposable income hypothesis. The
first posits that income correlates in a linear fashion with the purchase of legal services. 83 According to this view, the very poor make
least use of lawyers because they lack available funds to retain an
attorney, even in situations with serious legal implications. 84 The
very rich, by contrast, retain attorneys in situations presenting only
the barest possibility of legal consequence because they possess ample
funds for such expenses.8 5
The second version of the income hypothesis posits that, because
77.

See R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS 78-80 (1967).

78. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-78 (1977) (discussing bar
association arguments that advertising would increase cost of legal services but not use
of lawyers).
79. See Birnbaum, Legal Services Dilemma: View from the Bar, TRIAL, Aug. 1976,
at 27 (attorneys' "dedication to strict and honest self-regulation" distinguishes them
from businessmen); Jeffers, Institute on Advertising Within the Legal Profession-Con,
29 OKLA. L. REV. 620, 620 (1976) (lawyer's "prime duty is a public duty").
80. See T. PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34 (1954); The Bar Specializes,
supra note 15, at 178 (corporate law practice operates much like any other business).
81. A. Nichols, The Pricing of Physicians' and Lawyers' Services 6-7, 9, 57, 62-63 (1975)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation in Yale Law School Library) (discussing wide geographic
dispersion and substantial income variation among more than 355,000 licensed attorneys
in United States in 1970). This situation has existed for some time. Q. JOHNSTONE &
D. HOPSON, LAWYERS AND THEIR WORK 16 (1967) (296,000 attorneys-one lawyer for every
637 persons-in United States in 1963).
82. See generally E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (8th ed.
1962); J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECt COMPETITION (2d ed. 1969).
83. See, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 40-41 (ability to afford legal services
important factor in decision to use a lawyer).
84. Although use of the contingency fee minimizes this problem for low income persons seeking recompense for personal injury, such difficulties comprise a relatively small
portion of public legal need. B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 103-04. Other causes of action
allowing use of the contingency fee, such as a plaintiff's antitrust action, affect poor
persons only infrequently.
85. At this point, the first income hypothesis begins to merge with the property
ownership explanation of lawyer use. The latter view holds that property owners encounter more legal problems, not because of their greater wealth, but because owning
property involves them in activities that result in greater interaction with the legal
system.

HeinOnline -- 90 Yale L.J. 133 1980-1981

The Yale Law Journal

Vol. 90: 122, 1980

the poor have access to free legal aid programs, lowest lawyer use
occurs among middle income groups ineligible for legal aid but lacking disposable income with which to retain private attorneys."
Initially, the former version of the disposable income explanation

dominated discussion of the use of lawyers' services. Expanded legal
aid programs resulted, in part, from adherence to this view of the
unmet legal needy7 The very success of these programs8 8 helped foster
the second version of the hypothesis.8 9 Today's interest in legal clinics
86. See, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 5 n.4 (although extensive documentation does not exist, it appears that legal needs of middle income persons are underserved); Meserve, Our Forgotten Client: The Average American, 57 A.B.A.J. 1092, 1093
(1971) (bar is not providing adequate services to middle class individuals). The middle
income "gap" is also seen as a major cause of unmet legal need in England. I ROYAL
COMMISSION ON LECAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT 44 (1979) ("certain classes of people who need
the assistance of lawyers but cannot afford it are not eligible for financial assistance .... ")
87. The 1967 Amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2809
(a)(3) (1976), authorized the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity to establish
a legal services program "to provide legal services to persons unable to afford the services
of a private attorney." See H.R. REP. No. 866, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25, reprinted in
[1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2428, 2477. Legislative history accompanying subsequent amendments to the Act in 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2809(a)(1), 2809(a)(3) (1976), and 1972,
42 U.S.C. § 2809 (1976), as well as the creation in 1974 of the independent Legal Services
Corporation (LSC), 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1976), replacing the OEO legal service program, continued to emphasize the detrimental effect of poverty on lawyer use. See S. REP. No. 453,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-22, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2628, 2647;
H.R. REP. No. 815, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3224, 3228.
88. In 1972, the Director of OEO stated that the legal services program helped "millions of poor Americans" gain access "to legal redress that once was denied them by
their lack of means." H.R. REP. No. 815, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 28, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3224, 3250 (discussing hearing testimony of OEO Director Frank
Carlucci). In 1968, the OEO legal services program supported 265 local legal aid programs involving 1400 attorneys. S. REP. No. 453, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in
[1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2628, 2648. In 1976, the LSC aided 300 local programs involving nearly 3,000 full-time attorneys and 1,200 legal assistants. H.R. REP. No.
310, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 3, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4503, 4505.
89. Most commentators advancing the poverty version of the income explanation of
lawyer use wrote prior to 1970. See, e.g., Carlin, Howard, & Messinger, supra note 76, at
26-28; Project, The Legal Problems of the Rural Poor, 1969 DuKE L.J. 495, 593-95. Since
1970, the bulk of writing addressing the income factor has centered on the resources gap
of the middle class. See, e.g., ROYAL CoMMIssIoN ON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 86, at 44;
Meserve, supra note 86, at 1092.
Some commentators have attacked the poverty theory of income-based unmet need as a
self-fulfilling prophecy. See, e.g., M. ZANDER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE COMMUNITY 288
(1978) ("One reason for this conclusion [that income and lawyer use correlate] is that
studies have focused on the problems of the poor rather than investigating the problem
in the whole population.") Zander claims that "[t]he theory that poverty is the chief
cause of the unmet need collapses in the face of the empirical evidence .... " Id. No such
attack on this theory occurred during the 1960s. Many attorneys, however, see legal aid
services as meeting only a portion of the legal needs of low income persons. See F. MARKS,
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1, 9 (1971) (poor should be allowed to
define services available to them through OEO Legal Services Program); Carlin, Howard, & Messinger, supra note 76, at 55-56 (restrictions on legal aid activities and personnel and financial shortages prevent complete free coverage of legal needs of poor).
Furthermore, the middle class gap version of the income hypothesis is not new, see,
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and prepaid plans for wage earners reflects both this shift of views
as well as the relative decline of adherence to income theory in the
face of alternative explanations.9 0
One such alternative, related to the income hypothesis, suggests
that consumers are deterred from using legal services because they do
not consider such services to be worth the cost. This explanation, like
the income theory of underutilization, assumes that conventional
theories of market behavior apply to the purchase of legal services.9 1
Should this explanation of the unmet need prove correct, increased
lawyer use would await the development of a variety of less expensive
means of delivering legal services appropriate to different income
strata. The most widely used method of service delivery would be
one that best fits the demand curve of the largest number of people.
A third analysis of lawyer use holds that some consumers can not
identify the legal implications of a situation. Consequently, they do
not realize the value of consulting an attorney and therefore do not
use a lawyer. 9 2 One commentator describes this as the "legal incompetence" theory.93 It posits that persons would use lawyers more often
if they were more aware of the potential legal implications of situae.g., STASON, LEARY, McINTYRE, 9- KJELLENBERG, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH
MEMORANDUM SERIES No. 9: SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM ON PREPAID LEGAL EXPENSE

INSURANCE 1 (1960) ("Legal aid organizations have substantially answered the need for
the indigent .... However, certain elements of the Bar have recognized that many persons

of moderate means in this country are still without adequate legal services for a variety
of reasons."), but appears to enjoy a larger following now than in the past.
90. Income factors affecting legal needs have been discussed by the profession since
the advent of legal aid during the 1880s. See J. AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 53-56. However, other explanations of lawyer use arose during the 1960s and 1970s. See pp. 135-38 &
notes 91-106 infra.
91. See, e.g., R. DORFMAN, supra note 77, at 84-86. Examples of this approach can
be found in Paying less for a lawyer, supra note 5, at 523; Stein, Legal Services and

the Middle Class, 53 N.D. L. REv. 573, 580 (1977) (consumers believe legal services not
worth the cost). The English also see this as an impediment to lawyer use. ROYAL CoMtMISSION ON LEGAL SERVICES, suPra note 86, at 45 ("There may be reluctance to consult a

lawyer for fear of what is involved, in particular the cost.")
92. See, e.g., MISSOURI BAR, MISsOURI BAR PRENTICE HALL SURVEY: A MOTIVATIONAL
STUDY OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES AND L -w OFFICE MANAGEMENT 136 (1963); ROYAL COIMISSION
ON LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 86, at 45; Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and

Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 381, 423-24 (1965); Stein, supra note 91, at 580; Stolz,
supra note 74, at 419-20.
93. M. ZANDER, supra note 89, at 288; Zander, supra note 38, at 1676-77. Zander rejects
the legal incompetence

theory. Reviewing the ABA-ABF Survey,

a similar study in

Australia, and a study of allegedly legally competent Wisconsin businessmen, see Macauley,
Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 61 (1963),
he concludes that "the kind of problem seems to cause much greater differences in
lawyer use than the kind of potential client." M. ZANDER, suPra note 89, at 289. He
reasons that legal incompetence varies according to the problem and is evenly distributed
across economic, social, and occupational groups.
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tions and argues that increased lawyer use would be fostered by a
delivery system that increased public legal awareness. 9Individual attitudes toward lawyers and the legal system constitute
a fourth factor said to affect lawyer use. According to this hypothesis,
persons with more positive attitudes are more likely to use lawyers. 95
Central to this view is the belief that many persons regard attorneys
in traditional practice as aloof, uncaring, and inclined to complicate
rather than resolve a person's problems. 9 6
Attitude toward the legal system also includes a person's predisposition to use legal services. For example, although the ABA-ABF Survey respondents generally gave attorneys a positive evaluation, fortythree percent agreed that "[a] person should not call upon a lawyer
until he has exhausted every other possible way of solving his problem."'97 Insofar as attitude determines lawyer use, the alternative service delivery system that improves the public image of the profession
will also increase use of attorneys by the public.
A fifth hypothesis-that experience determines lawyer use-is derived from the common sense notion that the greater the number of
situations a person experiences in which a lawyer could be helpful,
the more likely he is to consult a lawyer. If, as some contend,95 lawyer
use varies significantly according to type of legal problem, personal
experience may constitute the most important factor affecting lawyer
use. To the extent that this explanation alone proves true, service
delivery methods can do little to increase public lawyer use.
A sixth explanation suggests that ownership of real property intro94. One Denver study found that attorneys in neighborhood law offices often perceived more and more serious legal problems in the situations brought to them than did
their clients. Sykes, Legal Needs of the Poor in the City of Denver, 4 Lkw & Soc. REV.
255, 262-63 (1969).
95. See, e.g., F. MARKS, supra note 54, at 39; MISSOURI BAR, supra note 92, at 136.
96. Although attorneys enjoy generally good community prestige, they also are considered more academic and less
pragmatically helpful than accountants, bankers, and real
estate agents. Q. JOHNSTONE & D. HOPSON, supra note 81, at 69 ("Despite their relatively
high prestige ranking, lawyers come in for considerable public criticism.") One British
scholar theorizes that "[g]oing to a solicitor is probably regarded by most of those who
contemplate it as being about equal in attraction to seeing the dentist-it may be necessary, but it is hardly likely to be a pleasant experience." M. ZANDER, supra note 89,
at 293.
Seven years after Johnstone and Hopson wrote, the Watergate scandal and many of
its principal villains, attorneys, dominated national news. Most observers believe Watergate undermined the prestige of lawyers. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, supra note 9, at 0001,
302 ("Watergate was the most severe jolt [of the post-War era] to the integrity of legal
authority. . . . The response of legal institutions was as destructive to confidence in the
legal order as was the criminal activity itself.")
97. B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 254-55.
98. See note 93 supra; B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 160.
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duces one into a network of social and economic connections that
lead to use of a lawyer. 99 Property ownership indicates a high probability that a person is familiar with lawyers, has experienced a number of situations in which a lawyer might be helpful, and has a
relatively high income.' 0 0 This hypothesis is, to date, the only one
well-supported by empirical data. Sociologists Leon Mayhew and
Albert Reiss surveyed 780 persons in the Detroit area and found
property ownership closely correlated with lawyer use. 1 1 Like the
experience explanation, the property hypothesis, if true, suggests that
delivery methods will have limited impact on public lawyer use.
Nevertheless, delivery methods that touch upon a component of the
property explanation, such as personal contacts with the legal system,
may increase lawyer use.
In fact, a seventh explanation of lawyer use emphasizes the importance of personal contact with those who can knowledgeably and
authoritatively suggest use of a lawyer. 10 2 According to this hypothesis,
the presence of informed intermediaries forms the crucial link in the
chain of lawyer use: those having such contact are more likely to use
an attorney. If this notion explains lawyer use, delivery methods
creating or increasing such personal contacts will increase public use
of attorneys.
The foremost proponent of the informed intermediaries theory
speaks of "lay" intermediaries. 10 3 However, the informed middleman
urging lawyer use could be an attorney as well as a doctor, policeman,
teacher, or employer. Most commentators appear to agree and, when
discussing the role of personal contact in the decision to use an at99. See Mayhew & Reiss, supra note 75, at 313 (respective orientations of legal profession toward business and property, and social organization of business and property
toward law results in greater lawyer use by persons owning real property than by nonowners).
100. Id. at 312-13. For example, the list of problem situations surveyed by the ABAABF Survey includes five matters directly relating to property ownership. See B. CURAN,
supra note 7, at 103.
101. Mayhew & Reiss, supra note 75, at 309, 312-13 (public use of attorneys "is heavily
oriented to property"). Mayhew and Reiss found that more than 60% of respondents'
most recent consultations with lawyers involved property.
102. Persons might obtain this information from friends and acquaintances who are
familiar with lawyers and legal problems as well as from lawyers themselves. See M.
ZANDER, supra note 89, at 292-96; Zander, supra note 38, at 1678-79; see, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 35-36; MISSOURI BAR, supra note 92, at 36; Ladinsky, supra note 71,
at 219; Paying less for a lawyer, supra note 5, at 523.
103. Zander saw friends, relatives and neighbors as likely lay intermediaries for almost
everyone. Depending upon the situation, he also saw social workers, marital counselors,
housing officials, union officers, police, doctors, and nurses playing the role of intermediary. M. ZANDER, supra note 89, at 295-96.
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torney, have included attorneys among potential informed authority
10 4
figures.
Thus, in the set of possible intermediaries, lawyers form a substantial subset. Unfortunately, the ABA-ABF Survey inquired only
into respondents' contacts with lawyers as friends, relatives, neighbors,
or social associates. Consequently, available data permit testing of
only this portion of the intermediary hypothesis. 1°5 However, evidence
of the importance of personal contact with lawyers would suggest that
other personal contacts are also important to lawyer use. If this notion
explains lawyer use, delivery methods creating or increasing such
personal contacts will most increase public use of lawyers.
Using the ABA-ABF Survey, which, despite its limitations,10 8 comprises the best quantitative data to date compiled regarding legal
problems and lawyer use, we tested the relative strength of the seven
explanations Qf lawyer use.
II.

The Empirical Study

The absence of authoritative evidence for any one of these explanations of lawyer use suggested the testing of the effect of the seven
factors on the behavior of a random sample of individuals. Measures
of the relative strength of each hypothesis could suggest criteria for
examining the potential of particular methods of legal services delivery.
A.

Methodology

We used, as our data base, the information collected by the ABAABF Survey. The survey data consisted of results from interviews of
104. See, e.g., R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, WHO SUES IN NEW YORK CITY? 65 (1962)
(accident victims having contact with lawyer or others suggesting legal action are more
likely to sue); cf. C. KADUSHIN, WHY PEOPLE GO TO PSYCHIATRISTs 312 (1969) (other medical

professionals figured prominently in referring persons to psychiatrists).
105. One survey question asked if the respondent had ever used an attorney in connection with a business he owned, B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 341 app. (Part IV Question I) [questions hereinafter cited without cross-reference by part (Pt.) and question (Q.)
number]; another asked if respondent had participated in group activity to solve a problem that used an attorney, id. at 336 app. (Pt. II Q. 62). Although respondents affirmatively answering these questions may have been brought into contact with an attorney
through a lay intermediary, such as a business partner or neighborhood activist, this
reasoning is too speculative to permit us to consider these two questions adequate tests
of the lay intermediary hypothesis. As both questions directly addressed contact with
lawyers, we consider them evidence only of lawyer contacts, not lay contacts.
106. Some questions, particularly those concerning respondents' estimates of the cost
of legal services, had a high nonresponse rate. See p. 141 infra. Nevertheless, the ABAABF Survey "is the only study [of legal needs] which is representative of the national
population" and "is also the most elaborate study to date." M. ZANDER, supra note 89,
at 393.
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a national cross-section of 2,064 adults conducted between October
1973 and March 1974.107 Each respondent was asked approximately
170 questions regarding his use of and attitudes toward lawyers, as
well as his social and economic background.' 0 1
With this sample, we employed linear regression and cross-tabulation to measure the strength of the seven explanations.' 0 9 These sta107. Planning for the survey began as early as 1971 and extensive efforts were deNoted to the development of questions and pretesting the questionnaire. The National
Opinion Research Center performed the field work associated with the survey. For a
full discussion of the implementation of the surley, see B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 16-18.
Survey respondents were randomly chosen from households listed in the United States
census. See B. CURRAN & F. SPALDING, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 30-33 (1974). Because the suriey was limited to households and because not all respondents who were
selected and screened agreed to participate, the sample is not perfectly representative of
the United States population. The very young, very old, males, blacks, hispanics, never
married, and persons with less than a high school education are slightly underrepresented,
but not to a significant degree. See B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 54-74.
108. For a copy of the complete questionnaire, see B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 279-382.
109. Linear regression equations describe the best line, if any, that can be drawn
among the points of a graph plotting data concerning one or more independent variables against data concerning a particular dependent variable, such as respondent's lawyer
use. The explanatory %alue of such an equation is related to how closely the plot of the
data resembles a particular pattern and not a random arrangement of points. Specific
calculations reieal the level of statistical significance of the equation-probability that
the pattern was a random one-and the percent of variation in the fact one seeks to
explain for which the independent variables are responsible-closeness of the pattern of
data to the line represented by the equation. See H. BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 384-86
(rev. 2d ed. 1979); Kim & Kohout, Multiple Regression Analysis: Subprogram Regression,
in N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER, & D. BRENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 320, 321-23 (2d ed. 1975).
The statistical significance of a regression equation is identified by its F-score. When
compared to the size of the relevant sample, the F-score reports the probability that the
relationship represented by the equation occurs randomly. This is the level of statistical
significance of the equation. Thus, if an equation is statistically significant at the .01
level, the chance that it results from a random distribution is only 1%. See Kim &
Kohout, supra, at 334-36. Commonly cited as conservative acceptable levels are .05, .01,
and .001. See H. BLALOCK, supra, at 161.

Also of Nalue in analyzing a regression equation is the R 2 score. The sum of the squares
of the distances between the actual data points plotted for the sample and those predicted by the regression equation, R' represents the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the regression equation. For example, an
equation with an R2 of .10 is said to explain 10% of the variation in a dependent variable. See Kim & Kohout, supra, at 279.
The R 2 and F-scores also help identify the importance of each of the independent
variables. The variable's F-score measures the statistical significance of its contribution
to the entire equation. When creating a regression equation, the computer program
used by this Project included variables in order of their F-scores. See Klecka, Discriminant
Analysis, in N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER, 9- D. BRENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE
FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 434, 453-54. The change in

R

2

caused by the addition of a par-

ticular variable to a particular equation indicates the variation explained by that variable relative to that equation. See Kim & Kohout, supra, at 336.
Also available for each independent variable are measures of their strength and direction. The b coefficient, or slope, describes the unit change in the dependent variable
resulting from a unit change in the independent variable. A large coefficient indicates a
strong independent variable. The sign of the coefficient indicates whether the direction

139
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tistical techniques enabled us to identify the particular characteristics
of respondents who did or did not use lawyers, and to test the statistical
merit of mathematical representations of the seven factors.1 10 The
representations are described below in the discussion of the test of
each explanation.
B.

Findings

The results of the tests of the proposed explanations of lawyer use
have been divided into categories based upon the strength of the corresponding linear regressions. Those in the weaker group explained
less than two percent of lawyer use, while those in the stronger group
explained more than five percent.
1. The Weaker Explanations
Four factors-income, price, awareness, and attitude-correlated weakly with lawyer use.
Income. To test the first variation of the income hypothesis, that
purchases of legal services increase as an individual's income increases,
we performed a mathematical regression comparing lawyer use and
income. This regression revealed that even large differences in income had only a mild impact on whether an individual used a lawyer.
Although the relationship was significant at the .01 level, it explained
only 0.2 percent of the variation in lawyer use.11 1
To test the second version of the income hypothesis, that because
the poor have access to legal aid, lowest lawyer use is concentrated
in middle income groups, we constructed a cross-tabulation comparof the independent variable's correlation with the dependent variable is positive or negafive. Id. at 323, 330.
We performed cross-tabulations only when the regression results did not supply the
information we sought. A cross-tabulation identifies the frequency with which two or
more sets of respondents possessing distinct characteristics share one or more other characteristics. See N. NiE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBRENNER, & D. BRENT, STATISTICAL
PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 218-22 (2d ed. 1975).
110. Statistics do not reveal the truth of a hypothesis or the direction of causation.
The most common use of statistics is to determine merely whether or not a hypothesis
has been disproven by a particular calculation. Much of the following analysis, therefore,
consists of our inferences from statistical measures and not irrefutable conclusions dictated
by the measures themselves. See H. BLALOCK, supra note 109, at 4-8, 154-56.
2
111. USE (0-1) = .60 + .01 Income (1-10); F of Equation = 6, R = .002. The figures
in parentheses indicate the lower and upper bounds of the values of the variables as
coded by the ABA-ABF Survey or as recoded by the Project prior to regression analysis.
Explanation of recoding is found in Appendix I, infra, or in the Project Code Book (on
file with Yale Law Journal).

HeinOnline -- 90 Yale L.J. 140 1980-1981

Access to Legal Services
ing income with lawyer use. Although the percentage of lower and
middle income persons who had used a lawyer was almost the same,
the test revealed that higher income persons had more frequently
employed a lawyer.11 2 In light of this information, we modified the
regression test to compare lawyer use with the presence of high income. The resulting equation revealed that even the difference in use
of lawyers between high income and non-high income persons was
not very large. The equation explained only one percent of the vari3
ation in lawyer use."
Price. The price hypothesis of legal services use suggests that respondents who believed a lawyer's services cost less would be more
likely to have obtained legal assistance. Unfortunately, data to test
this hypothesis were limited. The ABA-ABF Survey recorded respondents' estimates for only a limited number of services, 1 4 and more
than one-fourth of the respondents did not answer the relevant questions." 5 Moreover, legal services are not homogeneous and may vary
in nature and price. A will, for example, may require anything from
simple "boilerplate" to complicated estate planning. Estimates, therefore, may not be strictly comparable.
Despite these limitations, we constructed a regression comparing
cost estimates for wills and consultations with lawyer use. 1 6 The re112.

CROSS-TABuLATiON

OF INCOME WITH LAWYER USE

INCOME (annual, in dollars)
Percentages
Have Used a Lawyer?
0.4680
65.6
34.4
1221

Yes
No
N (weighted)

4681-9950
62.9
37.1
812

Raw Chi Square = 47.34

9951-17400
61.1
38.9
814

17400+
80.0
20.0
409

N (weighted)
2136
1120
3256

Significance = .01

2

Chi-square (X ) measures the degree of association between variables in cross-tabulation
where, as above, at least one of the variables is nominal, that is, has no scale. A high
chi-square value generally indicates close correlation between the row variable and the
column variable of a cross-tabulation. See H. BLALOCK, supra note 109, at 280-81.
113. USE (0-1) = .62 + .18 Income (0-1); F of Equation = 50, R 2 = .01.
114. Those services were consultation, will making, real estate representation, and
tort representation. B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 361 app.
115. ABA Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs, Special Report, ALTERNATIVES,
Jan. 1976, at 18.
116. See Appendix I, p. 156 infra. Estimates for representation in a real estate transaction and in a tort suit were not used. Estimates for those services were given as percentages, and not as dollar amounts. B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 361. Also, almost 40%
of the respondents were unwilling or unable to make estimates for those services. ABA
Special Committee to Survey Legal Needs, supra note 115, at 18.
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gression showed that as price estimates decreased, lawyer use increased
slightly. Significant at the .01 level, the equation explained only one
7
percent of the variation in lawyer use."
Awareness. The next hypothesis tested was that consumers, who are
better able to identify the legal implications of a problem, are more
likely to use a lawyer. In constructing a regression equation, we
grouped individuals according to their responses to questions asking
whether they would have sought legal advice in six hypothetical situations in which a lawyer could have been helpful, ranging from a
traffic accident to employment discrimination."1 The regression then
compared with the individual's lawyer use the number of hypotheticals where an individual would have consulted a lawyer. The resulting equation revealed that increases in legal awareness slightly increased use of a lawyer. Significant at the .01 level, the equation
explained only one percent of the variation in lawyer use. 119
Attitude. Using twenty-eight attitude questions, we tested the hypothesis that persons with more positive attitudes toward lawyers are
117. USE (0-1) = .72 - .0003 Will (5-700) (F = 9) - .001 Consultation (5-250) (F = 6);
F of Equation = 10; R 2 = .01.
118. See Appendix I, p. 159 infra.
119. USE (0-1) = A4 + .1 Awareness (0-6); F of Equation = 52, R2 = .01. Two hypotheses might explain the weakness of the awareness variable. First, even individuals
who are more likely to recognize that a lawyer could be helpful in a particular situation,
and who have high awareness scores, might actually use lawyers only in traditional legal
situations in which most persons recognize that a lawyer would be helpful. Second,
persons who are more likely to recognize the helpfulness of a lawyer in nontraditional
legal situations might be less likely to experience such situations, and consequently do
not use lawyers more often than those with low awareness scores. For example, highawareness persons may seldom be victims of job discrimination. It appears, however,
that the first situation is more probable. Individuals with greater awareness scores experienced at least as many problem situations as individuals with low awareness scores.
Respondents who had actually experienced job discrimination were twice as likely to
mention using a lawyer in response to the job discrimination hypothetical than those
who had never experienced the problem-l.l% compared to 5.2%. Further, those who
perceived themselves as victims of past job discrimination had slightly higher awareness
scores.
CROSS-TABULATION

OF LEGAL AWARENESS

SCoRE wi

NUMBER

OF

NON-ACuTE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

LEGAL AWARENESS SCORE
Percentages
Number of Non-Acute Problems Encountered
0-4
5-9
10-17
18-121
N (weighted)

0
5.3
4.1
3A
3.3
165

1
12.2
7.8
10.1
9.6
404

2
21.0
21.5
18.9
19.8
828

3
23.0
28.2
28.8
25.9
1076

Raw Chi-Square = 58.8

4
24.7
24.9
21.9
20.6
938

5
12.6
11.6
15.7
18.9
596

6
1.1
1.9
1.3
1.9
64

Significance = .001

142
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more likely to use lawyers. First, we applied factor analysis to identify
groupings of responses to the attitude questions. The resulting groups
clustered responses into an overall attitude measure and categories
relating to attitudes toward lawyers' personality traits, lawyers' ethics,
judges and trials, appropriate occasions for using a lawyer, and the
1 20
helpfulness of lawyers and the legal system.
We then performed a regression comparing all six attitude categories with lawyer use. Within the resulting equation, changes in attitudes toward lawyers' personality traits and ethics, as well as the
helpfulness of lawyers and the legal system, made no statistically significant difference in lawyer use. However, positive attitudes overall
and attitudes toward appropriate occasions for using a lawyer slightly
increased use, as did negative evaluations of judges and trials. The
contribution to the equation of overall attitude was significant at the
.05 level, while that of appropriateness and judges and trials was
significant at the .01 level. The entire equation, athough significant
at the .05 level, nevertheless explained only one percent of the vari12
ation in lawyer use. 1
2.

The Stronger Explanations

Three factors-experience, property ownership, and personal contacts with lawyers-correlated more strongly with lawyer use.
Experience. To measure whether an individual's particular experiences with situations that could have involved a lawyer increased his
use of a lawyer, we compared a respondent's lawyer use with the
acute and non-acute legal problems he had faced, as well as his age.
We defined as acute those situations in which an individual must confront the legal system if he wishes to obtain a particular form of relief over which the courts have almost exclusive control. For example,
an individual must apply to a court to seek a divorce or to defend a
criminal charge.' 2 2- In contrast, an individual can, but need not, apply
to a court for relief in non-acute situations, such as consumer complaints.1 23 Because the survey's coverage of acute and non-acute problems was not exhaustive, we used age as a further indicator of whether
a person would have experienced a situation in which a lawyer could
120. See Appendix II, pp. 160-63 infra. A score in each attitude category was compiled for each respondent. A high score indicated a positive attitude.
121. USE (0-1) = .7 + .01 Appropriateness (3-15) (F = 8) - .01 Judges/Trials (5-20)
16, R9 = .01.
(F = 24) + .01 Overall Attitude (13-65) (F = 14); F of Equation
122. For a complete list of the acute situations, see Appendix I, p. 159 infra.
123. For further discussion of these nonacute situations, see Appendix I, p. 158 infra.
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have been helpful. The longer one lives the more likely one is to
12 4
encounter a legal problem.
The resulting regression revealed that persons with more experience used a lawyer more frequently. Together, age, number of nonacute situations faced, and experience with an acute problem explained
twenty percent of variation in lawyer use. The equation was significant at the .01 level. The contribution to the equation of each of the
1 25
three variables was significant at the .01 level.
Property Ownership. In testing the hypothesis that an individual
who owns real property more frequently uses a lawyer, we employed
a regression that compared property ownership with lawyer use. The
resulting regression showed that property ownership had a strong influence on lawyer use, though not as much as experience. Persons
who owned property were far more likely to use a lawyer than those
without real property. The equation explained eleven percent of
PAST USE OF A LAWYER BY AGE:
CROSS-TABULATION

OF LAWYER USE WITH AGE

USED A LAWYER?
Percentages
Yes
35.6
68.7
71.6
75.8
74.3
2613

Age
18-26
27-37
38-48
49-59
60-90
N (weighted)

Raw Chi-Square = 435.8
CROSS-TABULATION OF NON-AcuTE

No
64.4
31.3
28.4
24.2
25.7
1458

N (weighted)
919
856
791
765
731
4062

Significance = .001
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH AGE

NUMBER OF NON-ACUTE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
Age
18-26
27-37
38-48
49-59
60-90
N (weighted)

0-3
50.3
27.3
18.5
9.4
6.3
849

4-7
11.0
22.4
26.3
24.2
22.3
843

Percentages
8-11
8.0
12.8
17.6
25.3
34.0
710

Raw Chi-Square = 1310

12-20
11.3
12.7
17.9
26.0
26.4
850

21-121
19.4
25.3
19.7
15.1
11.0
810

N (weighted)
919
856
791
765
731
4062

Significance = .001

One commentator, however, has noted that the cumulative effect of age is mild compared to the younger generation's increased encounters with legal problems and greater
willingness to use a lawyer. See Avichai, Trends in the Incidence of Legal Problems and
in the Use of Lawyers, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 289, 294-95.
125. USE (0-1) = .14 + .05 Non-Acute (1-10) (F = 386) + .04 Age (1-10) (F = 229) + .21
Acute (0-1) (F = 186); F of Equation = 340, R 2 = .20.

144
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lawyer use, and the correlation was significant at the .01 level.1 2 6

Contact with Lawyers. The last hypothesis tested was that an individual who had contacts with lawyers was more likely to use a lawyer.
We compared lawyer use with factors that indicated a respondent's
probable familiarity with lawyers or persons who know lawyers. These
included whether a respondent had a friend, relative, or neighbor
who was a lawyer, had used a lawyer in business, or had participated
27
in a group that had used a lawyer.'
The resulting regression revealed that persons with lawyer contacts
used lawyers more frequently. Significant at the .01 level, the regression equation explained six percent of the variation in lawyer use.
The contribution of each variable to the equation was significant at
the .01 level. The positive correlation of lawyer use with personal
acquaintance was very strong and that for group or business use was
2
relatively weak.1

3.

3

A Mathematical Model of Lawyer Use

In addition to testing the seven determinants individually, we also
performed a regression comparing the stronger variables together with
lawyer use. This regression enabled us to examine the relative strength
of the more powerful explanations, and also to identify whether the
pattern represented by one individual equation included part or all
of the other factors.
The resulting regression suggested a model of lawyer use that was
somewhat stronger than any of the three explanations taken individually. The cumulative regression equation explained twenty-three percent of lawyer use, and was significant at the .01 level. That the
amount explained was lower than the sum of the amounts explained
by each separately suggests that the three factors were related.12 9 The
individual contribution of each factor to the equation, however, was
significant at the .01 level. Experience explained twenty percent of
the variation in lawyer use, compared to only 1.8 percent for property
126.
127.

2
USE (0-1) = .39 + .35 Property (0-1); F of Equation = 490, R = .11.
See Appendix I, pp. 156-57 infra. Because the survey measured respondent's use

of an attorney for personal matters, there was no automatic correlation between the

variables. A person who used a lawyer for business but not for personal matters would
not be a lawyer user as defined by this Project.

128. USE (0-1) = .5 + .18 Personal Contacts (0-1) (F = 125) + .06 Business Use (0-1)
33); F of Equation = 85, R2 = .06.
(F = 41) + .10 Group Use (0-1) (F
129. See, e.g., H. BLALOCK, supra note 109, at 485; Kim & Kohout, supra note 109,
at 340-41.
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ownership and 1.5 percent for lawyer contacts. 130 Experience, therefore,
explained by far the greatest variation in lawyer use. Lawyer contacts
and property ownership, while also salient, were less powerful. 13 1
III.

Implications for Alternative Legal Delivery Systems

An examination of alternative legal delivery systems in light of the
somewhat unexpected results of our analysis enables us to assess the
systems' potential for increasing the public's use of lawyers. 132 Con130. Group and business use of a lawyer, unlike personal lawyer contacts, were very
weak determinants of lawyer use and were not included in this regression.
USE (0-1)
=
+.07
+EXPERIENCE (R 2 change = .20)
.03 Non-acute (1-10) (F = 123)
.03 Age
(1-10) (F = 100)
.24 Acute
(0-1) (F = 235)
+.18 PROPERTY (0-1) (F = 96) (R 2 change = .018)
+.13 LAWYER CONTACTS (0-1) (F = 80) (R - change = .015)
F of Equation = 248
2
R of Equation = .23
131. When the order of independent variables in the regression changes, the relative
strength of the independent variables often does as well. Therefore, for example, when
the equation included lawyer contacts first, property ownership second, and experience
third, the variation explained by p*operty ownership increased to 8%, and that of lawler
contacts to 6%, while experience decreased to 8%.
USE (0-1)
+.08
+LAWYER CONTACTS (R 2 change = .06)
.13 Personal contact (0-1) (F = 73)
.02 Business use
(0-1) (F = 9)
.03 Group use
(0-1) (F = 4)
+.26 PROPERTY (0-1) (F = 251) (R 2 change = .08)
+EXPERIENCE (R 2 change = .08)
.02 Non-acute
(1-10) (F = 80)
.00005 Age
(18-91) (F = 7)
.25 Acute
(0-1)
(F = 245)
F of Equation = 161
R 2 of Equation = .22
In this particular equation, business and group use were added to lawyer contacts, and
age was not recoded. These changes probably increased very slightly the variation explained by lawyer contacts and property, and decreased the variation explained by experience.
132. Despite its large sample size, comprehensive questionnaire, and rigorous methodology, certain limits of the ABA-ABF Survey mandate caution in attempting to draw
conclusions from any study that employs these data. A survey merely obtains respones
from a sample of respondents for one period of time. Such responses are subject to
change, and the attitude and price responses of the ABA-ABF Survey may be particularly
prone to such temporal shifts because of changes in the market for legal services. In
particular, it should be emphasized that the current market for legal services differs
substantially from that of 1973 to 1974 as a result of Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350 (1977), which overturned the profession's ban on advertising.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the conclusions of the Project are not derived directly from the empirical data, but rather from inferences based on the model derived
from the data.
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trary to the observations of some commentators, attitude, awareness,
and income have only a minor effect on lawyer use. The influence
of price on lawyer use is difficult to determine given the limits of
the data. The potential of alternative systems, 33 therefore, must be
evaluated in light of the three strong explanations of lawyer use-experience, property ownership, and lawyer contacts.
A.

The Limits of Alternative Delivery Systems
The results of our empirical study imply a limited role in increasing lawyer use for all alternative delivery systems. Our analysis indicates that lawyer use is primarily a function of an individual's experience, which is measured by the number of acute and nonacute
problems he has encountered as well as his age. These experience
factors, taken together, account for twenty percent of the variation
in lawyer use.134 Experience is largely an external factor, unalterable
by legal service delivery systems.
Alternative delivery systems, however, may modify the experience
component by altering the way in which a situation is perceived. An
example is the concept of preventive legal services or an annual legal
checkup, which both prepaid plans and clinics have considered promoting1 35 Such an approach, if successful, might greatly increase the
number of perceived legal problems. 36
Another strong determinant of lawyer use in our study is real prop133. This Project does not directly address the question of which of the three alternative delivery systems has the greatest potential for expansion, because it is impossible
to make such a determination on the basis of the data collected in the ABA-ABF Survey.
All three alternatives have been marketed with some success. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra
note 23, at 199-200 (suggesting that advertising of lawyer referral services may increase
use five to ten times); Paying less for a lawyer, supra note 5, at 526 (estimating that five
million families are covered by prepaid plans); Slavin, supra note 4, at 47 (describing
proliferation of legal clinics). Important policy questions remain that will affect the
growth of these three alternatives. Bar associations must decide what resources to devote
to LRSs. The growth of prepaid plans will be affected by decisions regarding how they
are to be treated under state insurance laws and federal tax laws. See L. DEITCH & D.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 26-27 (discussing problem of requiring prepaid plans to
satisfy state insurance requirements); Hendricks, Federal Income Tax Consequences for
Group Legal Service Plans, in LEGAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS: AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVES 285, 290
(1977) (Congress must consider whether to extend provision exempting employer contributions and legal benefits of prepaid plans from income tax). Bar associations must decide
what types of advertising are to be permissible. See note 170 infra. This Project discusses
only one of the aspects relevant to such policy decisions-which alternatives have the
greatest potential for increasing lawyer use.
134. See p. 144 supra.
135. See WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, supra note 3, at 63-66 (statement of Harriet Thayer);
Interview with Wayne Willis, partner at Hyatt Legal Clinics of Cleveland, Ohio, in New
Haven, Conn. (March 5, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
136. See Sackman, We Practice Preventive Law, I N~w DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES
61, 62 (1976). But see B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 11 (bar efforts to promote annual
legal checkup unsuccessful).
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erty ownership, which accounts for eleven percent of the variation
in lawyer use alone and 1.8 percent when combined with experience
and lawyer contacts.' 3 7 Like experience, however, real property ownership is an external factor that cannot be influenced by alternative
delivery systems." 8 The remaining determinants of lawyer use that
could be more readily altered by alternative systems-price, attitude,
awareness, and lawyer contacts"39-correlate less strongly with lawyer
140
use.
More particularly, the results of our analysis imply that two strategies often recommended for increasing lawyer use-improving the
image of lawyers and raising the legal awareness of the public-may
not significantly affect lawyer utilization. Many observers have argued
that lawyers are under-used because the public generally holds the
legal profession in low esteem.' 41 They have proposed, therefore, that
the bar seek to improve its image as a means of increasing the use
of lawyers. Frequently suggested is institutional advertising by state
and local bar associations.' 42 Our analysis suggests, however, that a
person's attitude toward the legal profession has little effect on whether
he uses a lawyer.' 43 Attempts to improve the profession's public image
and alter the public's attitude toward lawyers, therefore, are likely
to achieve little success in increasing lawyer use. 144
137. See pp. 144-46 supra.
138. Ownership of property correlates with lawyer use because property ownership
often leads to problems that are legal in nature and because property may be an indirect source of lawyer contacts. See p. 137 supra. Alternative delivery systems may also
be able to affect marginally the number of problems that are viewed as legal. See note
135 supra. Alternatives may also operate as an indirect source of lawyer contacts. See pp.
149-54 infra.
139. The importance of price, however, is probably understated in the model due to
the limitations of the data. See p. 141 supra. To the extent that price is an important
element in determining the amount of lawyer use, the potential for alternative delivery
systems may be less limited than is suggested here. Some alternatives may lower prices
substantially. See p. 154 infra.
140. However, we are hesitant to minimize the potential of alternative delivery methods too quickly. To some extent, the experience variables-acute problems, non-acute
problems, and age-are proxies for the other independent variables in the regression
equation, and vice versa. This overlap is suggested when the R2 of variables changes as
the order of inclusion of the variables into the equation is changed. See note 131 supra.
Furthermore, the survey results may be somewhat dated, see note 132 supra, and some
survey questions received inadequate responses, see p. 141 & note 106 supra.
141. See, e.g., B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 36; Berg, supra note 44, at 1.
142.

See ABA COMISSION ON ADVERTISING, BAR ASSOCIATION ADVERTISING:

A How-To

MANUAL 1 (1979) (more than $1.1 million spent on institutional advertising by state and
local bar associations, in part to build image of the bar). Some have suggested that
prepaid plans may be effective in changing attitudes. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 28, at 74; W. PFENNIGSTORF, supra note 48, at 3; WASHINGTON CONFERENCE,
suPra note 3, at 410 (remarks of Helen Nelson).
143. See p. 143 supra.
144. But see J. Haefner, Advertising Effectiveness Study Prepared for the Illinois State

148
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Others have argued that increased public awareness of the legal
dimensions of various problems will lead to increased lawyer use. 145
Our analysis, however, shows that legal awareness has a relatively
minor effect on lawyer use. 14

Consequently, general educational cam-

paigns and institutional advertising aimed at increasing public awareness of legal problems may also yield relatively minor increases in
147
lawyer use.
B. Enhancing Lawyer Contacts Through Alternative
Delivery Systems
Although the individual experience and property ownership factors are virtually unalterable by legal services delivery systems, the
three alternative systems may have some impact on the third important determinant of lawyer use-personal contacts with attorneys. 4
Personal contacts serve as a general information source concerning
the kinds and costs of services provided by lawyers. An attorney with
whom one has personal contact can also serve as an intermediary,
acquainting an individual with the legal system and particular local
lawyers capable of resolving his problem. 49 To the extent that an
alternative delivery system can serve the same functions as a lawyer
contact, it probably will succeed in increasing lawyer use.
Bar Association 10-11 (Apr. 4, 1977) (institutional advertising changes attitudes and expressed intention to have will prepared) (on file with Yale Law Journal). This study,
however, did not measure changes in lawyer use.
145. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 36; Carlin, supra note 6, at 644-45. One
way of encouraging legal awareness might be through institutional advertising. See ABA
COMMIssION ON ADVERTISING, supra note 142, at 1. Others have argued that LRSs can
serve as a general educational resource concerning the legal implications of problem
situations. See Berg, supra note 44, at 4-5.
146. See p. 142 supra.
147. A distinction must be drawn between educational campaigns and advertising that
seek only to inform the public of the legal implications of certain problem situations,
and advertising that provides more specific information, such as cost or how a lawyer
may be helpful in a specific context. The latter may have some impact on lawyer use,
because it may serve as a substitute for information supplied by lawyer contacts.
148. See p. 145 supra.
149. The traditional notion that a lawyer ought to secure clients through a wellmerited reputation for competence and honesty was based on the experience of the
small town practitioner who had contacts with the entire community. See B. CHRISTENSEN,
supra note 23, at 128-30. Although such contacts served as adequate sources of information and sound basis for lawyer selection in the small town, they can hardly serve the
same function in modern urban America where contacts are less pervasive. Id. at 130-31.
As a consequence, alternative delivery systems must act as a substitute for lawyer contacts. See Goodman, supra note 50, at 15 (prepaid plans perform same functions formerly performed in small town by lawyer reputation); Hobbs, Lawyer Advertising: A
Moderate Proposal, ALTERNATIVES, Feb. 1976, at 3 (advertising may serve same function
as lawyer contacts for well-to-do).
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1. Lawyer Referral Service (LRS)
By enabling a client to consult with a lawyer at a nominal fee, the
LRS provides potential for lawyer contact and access to information.
Some information may be provided to the client at the initial screening interview, 5 0 but the potential for providing information at this
point is limited by the fact that so few LRSs have staff attorneys. 151
Nevertheless, the client can use this opportunity to discover what, if
anything, a lawyer can do to resolve his problem, and how much
these services will cost. Although this may be useful, the potential
client has similar opportunities with other alternative systems that
he may be able to use at less cost.152 Unfortunately, the LRS provides
information at a relatively high search cost, because the client must
endure substantial inconvenience in order to arrange an initial screening. 153 This cost limits the effectiveness of the LRS as a potential
information source.
By actually making an appointment with an attorney for a prospective client, the LRS may be useful as a resource for lawyer selection.
The service thus helps to overcome a potential client's initial hesitation in contacting an attorney.154 Unlike a lawyer contact who is a
friend, relative or neighbor, however, the LRS lacks an ongoing relationship with the consumer. 55 As a consequence, consumers may
consider an LRS referral less reliable than a recommendation made
by a lawyer friend or relative whom they know and trust. Consumer
mistrust may be justified, as membership in LRS panels is not subject to careful screening; LRS panels represent only a cross-section
of the bar. 156
150. See Commitment and Vision: The New Look in LRS, 3 NEw DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
SERVICES 49, 51 (1978) (interview with Paul V. Carlin, Director of Consumer Lawyer Referral Service for District of Columbia Bar).
151. See note 42 supra. But see Carlin, supra note 6, at 651 (new ABA Standards urge
upgrading of screening function).
152. See pp. 151, 153 infra.
153. See B. CHRISTENSEN, suPra note 23, at 193-94 (inconvenience of initial screening
interview may be formidable barrier to use of LRSs); WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, supra
note 3, at 35 (remarks of Frank Jones).
154. See Christensen, supra note 39, at 279, 287.
155. Most users of LRSs are seeking a lawyer for the first time. See Murphy, supra
note 43, at 253.
156. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 178-83; Christensen, supra note 39, at 288.
Similar problems exist with the composition of special panels and matching a client with
a lawyer who is a specialist. B. CHRISTENSEN, suPra note 23, at 183-87; Christensen, supra
note 39, at 288.
Of course, some of these problems could be remedied by upgrading the minimum
standards required for panel membership and adding other safeguards. See Carlin, supra
note 6 (discussing various recommendations for improving LRS).
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2. Prepaid Plans: Open- and Closed-Panel
Open-panel plans may be effective information sources. Prior to
enrollment in an open-panel plan an individual is usually informed
about the legal services to which he will be entitled and their cost.

57

Nevertheless, open panels may not provide full information on costs
because benefits are sometimes listed in dollar amounts or hours of
legal work. 5 8 The consumer must still estimate how many hours or
how many dollars a particular service will require in order to ascertain whether such expenses are fully covered by his policy.
More important, most open-panel plans offer members a limited
number of free consultations and advise clients on what a lawyer can
do to resolve a particular problem. 159 Open-panel plans should increase lawyer use by offering this important information source as an
integral part of the plan's operation.
Open-panel plans may also serve as either a formal or informal referral service. Most open-panel plans have this feature. 160 In contrast
to the LRS, however, these referrals come from an organization with
which the consumer has an ongoing relationship. Consumers may
therefore consider such open-panel referrals more reliable, and the
likelihood that they will actually take advantage of the referral advice and consult a lawyer may be greater. Furthermore, open-panel
plans have a financial incentive to provide referrals the consumer finds
adequate. Poor referrals would threaten continued enrollment in the
16 1
plan.
Closed-panel plans also provide specific cost information and the
opportunity for free consultations.1 2 Information on cost may be
more detailed than with open panels because some closed panels limit coverage to specific matters and not to specific dollar or hour
amounts. 163 Consultations under a closed-panel plan may involve low157. See DeMent, sukra note 48, at 631.
158. See note 51 supra.
159. See, e.g., L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 52, 68 (Ohio Legal Services
Fund, Utah Prepaid Legal Services Plan); Broadman & Ohman, supra note 49, at 136-37
(New York County Legal Services Corporation Prepaid Legal Services Plan).
160. See, e.g., L. DEITCH &. D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 41; Murphy, supra note 43,
at 262-63 (bar-sponsored open-panel plan run in conjunction with LRS). To the extent
that the lawyer is chosen by a referral system, however, the primary justification for
open panels-freedom of choice-is vitiated.
161. Bar associations that sponsor open-panel plans may have a more diffused incentive to make effective referrals, and are less able to do so because of the problems inherent in screening their own members. See B. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 23, at 183.
162. See DeMent, supra note 48, at 631.
163. See, e.g., Broadman & Ohman, supra note 49, at 117-43 (listing closed panels
using this system).
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er search costs than consultations obtained under open-panel plans
or through LRSs because closed-panel attorneys may be willing to
take certain steps to ensure easy access to their services.10 4 As a further step, closed-panel plans often inform members about the benefits
of consulting a lawyer through newsletters, meetings, and seminars. 165
To a greater extent than LRSs and open-panel plans, closed-panel
arrangements reduce their members' search costs because the plan
assumes total responsibility for selecting its members' attorneys. Many
consumers may prefer to leave attorney selection in the hands of a
trusted intermediary. 1 6 The strong relationship between the member
and sponsoring group can be expected to create more trust than found
in LRSs and open-panel arrangements. This important combination
of free consultation and general dissemination of information could
enable closed-panel plans to provide their members with the greatest
amount of information at the lowest search cost.
3. Legal Clinics
Legal clinics, by advertising,167 provide consumers with extensive
information on the price of various legal services at relatively low
search cost. 1 68 Advertising may, however, convey only limited price
164. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 41 ("Lawyers who receive all or
a good portion of their income from the plan may be more willing to schedule hours to
meet members' requirements, organize facilities to put clients at ease, and locate near
the place of employment or other convenient location."); Comment, supra note 49, at
865 (Laborers' Local 423 Plan located office in same building as union office and hiring
hall).
165. See, e.g., WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, suPra note 3, at 67-69 (statement of Harriet
Thayer) (Consumers' Group Legal Services Plan use of seminars and newsletters); Sackman,
supra note 136, at 61-62 (1115 Prepaid Legal Service Care's use of booklets, newsletters, and
seminars); Comment, supra note 49, at 868 (prepaid plan's use of newsletters, seminars,
and workshops to inform members about legal rights in specific situations). The information conveyed must concern the specific benefits from consulting a lawyer, and not just
general information on recognizing legal problems. See note 147 supra.
166. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 41 (members of plan who lack
experience may prefer to have group designate lawyers it considers competent); Bernstein,
supra note 2, at 474 ("[T]he problems surrounding the selection of an attorney are so
difficult that union members generally would prefer to be represented by lawyers whose
competence and qualifications have been ascertained by their unions.")
167. To the extent that advertising operates as a substitute for lawyer contacts, both
traditional firms and clinics may use it to increase lawyer use. Current evidence indicates, however, that most traditional practitioners do not advertise. See Slavin, supra
note 4, at 47 (only 3% of attorneys surveyed have used advertising). Clinics, on the
other hand, depend on advertising as an integral part of their operations. See Muris &
McChesney, supra note 66, at 193-95. Moreover, the price advantages of clinics should
make them the preferred delivery system, at least for routine services. See p. 154 infra.
168. See Consumer Information Remedies 210 (June 1, 1979) (FTC briefing book) (on
file with Yale Law Journal).
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information. 169 Clinics can also provide information concerning the
benefits of lawyer services both in their advertising 1'70 and in free or
low-fee consultations.' 7 ' Clinics have further sought to minimize the
search costs involved in seeking out their services by using storefront
72
locations and having flexible hours.
Clinics can serve a lawyer referral function by providing consumers
with limited information about the clinic's lawyers in their advertising. 7 3 As with the information provided by LRSs, however, this advertising is not offered by someone with whom the consumer has an
ongoing relationship. The consumer will likely find such advertising
information even less reliable than that from LRSs, because advertising is provided by someone who has an interest in supplying only
174
positive information.
4.

Conclusions
The foregoing assessment of the three alternative delivery systems
yields suggestions for increasing lawyer use. For individuals who belong to a group that could readily employ a prepaid plan,1'7 closed
169.

See ABA COMMISSION ON ADVERTISING, INDIVIDUAL LAWYER ADVERTISING: A How-To
10 (1979) (difficult to provide price information through mass media).
170. Advertising information such as the quality of services may be limited by legal
constraints. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383-84 (1977) (bar has special
role to play in regulating advertising to see that it is not deceptive).
In the wake of Bates, some state bar organizations have proposed rules that would
substantially limit the amount and type of information contained in advertising. See
Ostrowsky, States Respond to Bates, 2 NEw DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 137, 137-39 (1977).
Externalities may also inhibit clinics from including information on the benefits of
consulting an attorney, because the benefits of such advertising may inure to the profession as a whole. See Interview with Wayne Willis, supra note 135 (advertising of Hyatt
Clinic increases number of clients obtained by many local firms).
MANUAL

171.

See

D. MIARON, LEGAL CLINICS: ANALYSIS AND SURVEY 8

(2d ed. 1977).

172. See Meyers, supra note 68, at 111.
173. The amount of information provided is limited by the constraints of the medium
and the cost of advertising. See ABA COISSION ON ADVERTISING, supra note 169, at 8
(copy for newspaper ads must be brief). But cf. Dryer, Clients and Lawyers at Odds on
Advertising, 2 NEW DIREcTIONS IN LEGAL SERVICES 146, 150 (1977) (consumers prefer high
information ads).

174. See Christensen, supra note 39, at 284. See also Ladinsky, supra note 71, at 216-18

(advertising may not remedy consumer's inability to judge legal services market).
175. For examples of groups that have profitably employed closed-panel plans, see
p. 130 supra.
It will be difficult to market prepaid plans to individuals because of the problem of
adverse selection. If plan members enroll on an individual basis, those people who
anticipate a large number of future legal problems will be the most likely to enroll. As
a consequence, the plan may be seriously overburdened by a large number of problems
and may experience solvency problems. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at
37 (discussing adverse selection problems of voluntary plans). Automatic enrollment of
group members may also be preferable for administrative reasons. Id. In practice, marketing voluntary enrollment plans has been difficult and some plans have experienced
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panels offer the best source of information as to the costs and benefits
of consulting a lawyer, and also the most direct form of lawyer selection. Closed-panel prepaids are thus most likely to fulfill the instrumental function of lawyer contact and thereby increase lawyer
use. Legal clinics, rather than LRSs, are more likely to serve the
function of lawyer contact through their advertising for those individuals who are not members of groups for which prepaid plans are
1 76
marketable or feasible.

D.

Theoretical Impact of Price on Delivery Systems

Economic theory suggests that price is an important factor affecting
the rate of use of any service, including legal services. 17 7 Limitations
of the survey data made it difficult for us to estimate the importance
of price in the decision to use a lawyer. 178 The greater the importance
of price considerations, however, the greater should be the preference
for closed-panel prepaid plans and clinics. Both of these alternatives
offer the best opportunity for reducing the price of legal services by
generating a high volume of similar legal work and thereby permitting both economies of scale and standardization, with a concomitant
reduction in costs. 79 Open-panel prepaids and LRSs, by contrast, lack
solvency problems. See DeMent, supra note 48, at 634-35. But see W. PFENNIGSTORF, supra
note 48, at 28 (successful marketing of legal insurance to individuals in Europe). The
European experience is not analogous, however, because coverage is generally restricted
to legal expenses for events such as automobile accidents. Id. at 47.
The market for prepaids is nonetheless large, considering the number of persons that
belong to groups. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 104 (over 20 million
members of unions and teacher associations).
176. The advantages of clinics may be limited to the provision of routine services
for which clinics enjoy a price advantage over traditional firms. See p. 131 supra. For
nonroutine services, traditional firms that advertise may be as successful as clinics at
increasing lawyer use.
177. See p. 135 supra.
178. High volume may reduce costs by allowing for greater specialization of attorneys,
the use of paralegals, employment of systems management involving the standardization
and routinization of tasks, and the substitution of cost-saving capital for labor, as in
the use of memory typewriters and pre-printed forms. See Muris & McChesney, supra
note 66. Clinics rely on advertising to generate the necessary high volume. id. at 183.
Closed-panel prepaid plans create high volume by channeling all members' legal problems to a limited number of lawyers. See L. DEITCH & D. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at
74-75; DeMent, supra note 48, at 630.
Although the empirical data are limited, they appear to show that closed-panel prepaid plans have costs far lower than those of open panels, see WASHINGTON CONFERENCE,
supra note 3, at 180 (testimony of Jules Bernstein); Hermann, supra note 56, at 444, and
that clinics cost less than traditional firms, see p. 131 supra.
179. However, prepaid plans bear a disadvantage that clinics do not. Nearly 10% of
the sample expressed aversion to the concept of insuring against legal problems.
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similar mechanisms for generating high volume and lower costs.' 8 0
Our model suggests that of the two cost-saving alternative delivery
systems, closed-panel prepaid plans would be more effective than
clinics because of their ability to facilitate lawyer contacts.'
Conclusion
Little empirical study has been addressed to the complex processes
of lawyer selection and use. This lack of information is complicated
further by changing rules governing attorneys' conduct and emerging
innovations in the marketing of legal services, including the three
major service delivery methods discussed by this Project. Our empirical analysis of the extensive ABA-ABF Survey suggests that experience, property ownership, and personal contacts with lawyers are
the most important determinants of lawyer use. The last factor-personal contacts-is relevant in the evaluation of the alternative delivery
systems studied. Two service delivery methods-closed-panel prepaid
plans and legal clinics-offer the greatest promise for fulfilling the
large, unmet public legal need that has long troubled the organized
bar. The legal profession should now remove the remaining impediments to their development.

APPENDIX I
Recoded Data and Computed Variables
Recoded Variables

In order to explore and present the data meaningfully, certain variables
in the ABA-ABF Survey data were recoded, collapsed from raw form into
a smaller number of categories, and redivided so as to separate at significant points. Brief descriptions of variables recoded for the Project follow.
1. Occupational Status
Survey respondents were asked their occupations 8 2 (Pt. II, Q. 23) and
assigned the corresponding Hodge-Siegel occupational prestige score de180. Because the LRS refers clients to all panel members, no single panel member
can develop a high volume of matters. Open-panel plans may have the potential for generating high volumes by extensively referring clients to a few firms.
181. See p. 152 supra.
182. A copy of the questionnaire is reprinted in B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 279-382.
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veloped by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) of the University of Chicago.1 83 The Hodge-Siegel formula combines the normal
education, income, and social prestige of various occupations. Then, by
rank-ordering occupations according to their association with these traits,
it assigns a numerical score to each occupation denoting overall status. The
entire Hodge-Siegel scale ranges from 14 to 82; the sample had an equally
wide range. For cross-tabulation, these scores were stratified into either
quartiles or thirds.
2. Estimated Costs of Attorneys' Services
In Pait V of the survey, respondents were asked to estimate the cost
of a half-hour consultation with a lawyer (Pt. V, Q. 2A) and of the making of a simple will (Q. 2B). Responses given in dollar amounts were
recoded into quartiles for cross-tabulation and occasionally regression. The
mean estimate cost for a consultation was $31 and for a will, $85.184 There
was no observed relationship between respondent income and either the
estimated will and consultation costs or willingness to make an estimate

-a possible indicator of respondents' awareness of legal fees.
Personal Contact with a Lawyer
Part V of the survey asked respondents four questions about personal
contact with a lawyer. Each was asked if he knew a relative who was a

3.

183. Hodge-Siegel scoring and its ranking of various occupations are discussed in
Hodge, Siegel, & Rossi, Occupational Prestige in the United States 1925-1963, 70 AM. J.
Soc. 286 (1964). The efficacy of the Hodge-Siegel index as an indicator of overall social
status is examined and compared to other status indices in R. HAUSER & D. FEATHERMAN,
THE PROCESS OF STRATIFICATION: TRENDS AND ANALYSIS 3-59 (1977).
COST ESTIMATES

184.

PERCEIVED COSTS OF HALF-HOUR LAWYER CONSULTATION

Estimated Fee (in dollars)

Percent of Sample
26.8
30.5
14.8
27.7

5-20
22-25
26-48
50-88

99.8
Mean = 31

N = 2620

PERCEIVED COSTS OF A WILL

Estimated Fee (in dollars)

Percent of Sample

2-32
33-50
55-100

24.8
30.4
26.1

101-1200

18.5
99.8

Mean = 85

N = 2988
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lawyer (Q. 10); a friend who was a lawyer (Q. 11); a neighbor who was a
lawyer (Q. 12); or if he knew a lawyer through some other social context

(Q. 13). The Project posited that the exact relationship to a lawyer acquaintance was not as important as the fact of the relationship itself. These
various lawyer contacts were recoded so that a respondent received a score
of one on a single variable if he indicated knowing a lawyer in any one of
the four capacities addressed by the survey.18 5
Computed Variables
Because much of the raw survey information was fragmented, construction of single variables was often required to measure respondent traits.
185. Frequency distribution of the recoded lawyer contacts variable is compared below with that of its component lawyer contact variables.
CONTACT WITH LAWYERS (resulting from recoding of four variables)
Yes
No

65.2
34.8
100.0

Have a relative who is a lawyer:
Yes
No
No Answer

12.3
87.2
.5
100.0

Have a friend who is a lawyer:
Yes
No
No Answer

44.6
54.9
.6
100.1

Have a neighbor who is a lawyer:

Yes

22.0

No
Don't Know
No Answer

68.1
9.4
.5
100.0

Have met a lawyer in organizations to which
respondent belongs or at work:
Yes
No
No Answer

45.0
54.4
.6
100.0

N = 4071
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1. Number of Non-Acute Problems
The survey identified forty-four situations that give rise to legal problems 8 6 and asked respondents if they had encountered such situations.
Respondents were also asked how often they had encountered each of
the twenty-eight non-acute problems.' 8 7 By summing these twenty-eight
responses, a variable was constructed to indicate the aggregate number
of non-acute problems encountered by each respondent.'8 8
2. Occurrence of Acute Problems
Because certain situations have more apparent, immediate, and sharp
legal consequences than others, a variable composed only of such acute
186. We considered 44 problems deemed in the survey to have legal implications; in
contrast, Curran considered only 29 legal problems that frequently befall average citizens.
B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 103-04. The difference results from the Project having considered each divorce of a respondent to be a separate legal problem, and to its treatment
of the following situations-some of which are not intrinsically adversarial-as fraught
with potential legal problems: arranging to have a home built (Q. 9); having a house
repaired or improved (Q. 11); taking out a mortgage (Q. 13); taking out a loan (Q. 19);
garnishment of spouse's wages (Q. 32); going through a bankruptcy (Q. 33); receiving a
criminal complaint (Q. 40F); appearing in court as a defendant (for other than criminal
charges or traffic violations) (Q. 44); appearing in court as a plaintiff (Q. 45); adopting
a child (Q. 48); spouse having a will (Q. 57); and group activity to solve a problem
(Q. 62). These 12 situations containing legal implication, and the possibility of a second, third, or fourth divorce, result in 15 additional "legal problems" used to compile
the Project's list of legal problems but absent from the Curran list.
187. The 28 survey questions (all in Part II of the questionnaire) used in computing
the number of non-acute problems variable for this Project were: 7A, 8A, 9A, 10A, IlA,
12A, 13A, 14A, 16A, 17A, 18A, 19A, 20A, 21A, 25A, 26A, 27A, 28A, 32A, 33A, 38A, 39A,
45A, 48A, 49A, 50A, 61A, and 62A. The Project presented acute problems in a separate
computed variable.
188. The following table shows the frequency distribution of this variable.
NUMBER OF NoN-AcuTE PROBLEMS

Score

Percent of Sample

0-1
2-3
4-5
6-7
8-9
10-11
12-15
16-20
21-31
32-121

9.4
10.6
10.2
10.6
9.4
8.0
11.6
9.7
10.5
10.0
100.0

N = 4071

Mean = 15.7

Median = 9.5

These scores were stratified into deciles for regression and into quartiles for crosstabulation. The Project Code Book (on file with Yale Law Journal) contains complete
information about the frequency with which survey respondents encountered these individual problems.
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problems was computed. Situations composing this variable were seeking
a divorce (Pt. II, Q. 52) (which recognizes up to four divorces); facing
a criminal charge (Pt. II, Q. 41); responding to a criminal complaint made
to police in connection with personal injury or property damage (Pt. II,
Q. 40F); being named a defendant in a non-criminal, non-traffic case (Pt.
H, Q. 44); and answering a personal injury or property damage claim
(Pt. II, Q. 40A). Fifteen percent of the sample experienced at least one
of these acute problems.' 8 9 For regression, this variable was encoded to
range from zero to one.' 9 0
3.

Attitudes Toward Lawyers

The survey contained twenty-eight questions. Six new attitude variables
were constructed from various groupings of the twenty-eight attitude questions. These new variables are presented in Appendix II, infra.
4. Legal Awareness
The survey initially presented respondents with six hypothetical situations and then asked what the respondent would do about each. (Pt. I, Qs.
1-6). The responses were encoded with a value of one whenever respondents indicated they would use a lawyer as a resource and a value of zero
whenever use of a lawyer was never suggested. A new variable measuring
the awareness of the legal implications of the hypothetical problems was
then computed by adding together the number of hypothetical problems
for which a respondent had suggested use of a lawyer.'91
189. The Project Code Book (on file with Yale Law Journal) records the frequency
distributions for the component variables constituting the computed acute problems variable.
190. We reasoned that the presence of more acute problems would not make past use
of an attorney more likely and that a second acute problem would not be likely to provide greater incentive to seek counsel than the first. The data, which showed the rate
of lawer use among respondents with one acute problem to be equivalent to that of
respondents with multiple acute problems, confirmed this assumption. The crucial point
of demarcation, we concluded, was the occurrence of a first acute problem. We therefore
recorded the data so that zero indicated no respondent experience with acute problems
and one indicated past respondent experience with one or more acute problems.
191. SUGGESTION OF LAWYER RESOURCE IN RESPONSE TO HYPoTHETICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
Times attorney suggested

Percent of sample

0
I

4.1
9.9

2

20.3

3

26.4

4

23.0

5
6

14.6
1.6

100.0
N

= 4071

Mean = 3.05

The Project Code Book presents data for each of the six hypothetical problems.
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APPENDIX II

Variables Derived from Factor Analysis of Attitude Questions
Part III of the survey contained twenty-eight attitude questions designed to examine respondent attitudes toward lawyers, judges, and the
legal system. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with each of
twenty-eight statements about either lawyers or some other aspect of the
legal system. Likert Scale scoring defined the range of responses: 1) agree
strongly; 2) agree slightly; 3) disagree slightly; 4) disagree strongly; 5) can't
decide; 8) don't know; 9) no answer. In order to conduct a factor analysis
of the data, question responses were encoded onto a progressive scale,
with more favorable responses receiving higher scores. The categories toward lawyers, judges, or the legal system of the resulting code were: 1)
strongly dislike; 2) dislike; 3) neutral; 4) like; 5) strongly like.' 92
Curran divided the twenty-eight attitude questions of Part III of the
survey into seven categories: consulting lawyers, work of lawyers, lawyerclient exchange, cost of lawyers' services, lawyers' ethics, the courts, and
the legal system.193 This division, although logical to the legally trained
onlooker, may not have accurately reflected the actual thought patterns
and attitudes of the respondents. Therefore, we chose to apply factor
analysis to the attitude-question data, both to seek data parsimony and to
discover combinations of responses associated by the survey respondents
rather than by onlookers. Factor analysis of the data led to computation
of an overall attitude measure-attorall-as well as five distinct attitudinal
groupings of question responses represented by variables attlaw, lawsys,
judtri, lawethic, and lawwhen.
Factor analysis is a statistical technique that, when applied to a data
set, plots the best regression lines that can be constructed for various portions of the data. These plotted lines represent common associations among
the data. In effect, they are common threads linking certain variables
within the data set. In the technical language, "membership" in these
groups is determined by a variable's "loading"-correlation with a given
factor. Variables with high loadings on a single factor "belong" in a
group, that is, they are associated.' 9 4 Each of the six attitude variables
discussed above is comprised of variables with high loadings on a single
one of the six significant factors that could be constructed for the survey's
attitude responses. 195 Use of these newly computed variables provides sev192. Space limits preclude a full description of the factoring process resulting in
these new measures of respondent attitude. This description is presented in a February
11, 1980, research memorandum by the authors. Factor Analysis of ABA-ABF Survey
Attitude Questions (on file with Yale Law Journal).
193. B. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 235-36.
194. This explanation of factor analysis is necessarily abbreviated and simplified. For
general explanation of factor analysis and the SPSS package's use of this statistical tool,
see Kim, FactorAnalysis, in N. NIE, C. HULL, J. JENKINS, K. STEINBREN\ER, & D. BRENT, STATISTICAL PACKAGE FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 468 (2d ed. 1975). A more detailed explanation
of factor analysis is found in Rummel, Understanding Factor Analysis, 11 J. CoNFLICT
RESOv.UTioN 444 (1967).
195. The composition of response clusters revealed by factor analysis frequently differed from those imposed on the data in B. CURRAN, supra note 7. New variables "'law-
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ethic" and "judtri" are substantially similar to Curran's groups "lawyers' ethics" and
"the courts." However, factor analysis shows the question response clusters regarding
lawyer-client exchange (attlaw), the legal system (lawsys), and consulting lawyers (lawwhen) to be different from those presumed in the ABA-ABF study. Interestingly, no
separate factor emerges concerning the cost of lawyers' services. The factor analysis therefore finds an overall measure of attitude and five distinct attitudinal groups of question
responses in contrast to the seven groupings discussed by Curran.
The initial construction of the factor matrix through PA2 (principal axes with iteration) factoring produced six factors with an eigenvalue (a numerical characteristic of a
matrix) of greater than one. Factors with eigenvalues of less than one are not considered
significant explainers of a data mass. See Kim, supra note 194, at 469-78; Rummel, supra
note 194, at 462-66. The presence of few significant factors compared to the number of
questions and respondents suggests a consistent pattern of responses among the sample.
See id. at 463. These six (unrotated) factors together explain 35.6 percent of the variance
in the attitude data. Factor I by itself explains 57.3 percent of that part of the variance
-that is, 35.6 percent-explained by the six factors. Factor 1 was also the only one of
the first six factors for which many variables possessed high loadings (a minimum of
approximately 0.4 correlation between the variable and the factor). For that reason, Factor
1 was used to construct a composite attitude variable, "attorall," composed of the respondent's scores for 13 of the statements.
Questions with similar factor loadings are more closely related than questions with
more disparate factor loadings. In essence, each factor resulting from factor analysis represents a common thread in the pattern of responses to the statements. Factors that have
many variables loading on (correlating with) them and large eigenvalues are stronger
explanatory threads than factors with fewer, lower loadings and smaller eigenvalues. For
the largest composite variable, attorall, the common thread was general attitude toward
the legal world. However, responses to these 13 statements were more consistent responses
than were responses to the full 28 statements.
The 13 questions from Part III of the survey used in computing attorall were Qs. 6,
9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, and 28. The large number of variables loading high
on Factor 1, as well as the many variables having a strong correlation with the factor but
not included in the computation of attorall, suggest that each respondent's answers to
the Part III questions formed a relatively consistent pattern of attitudes toward the legal
world. Graphical plotting of the correlation coefficients between factors confirms this.
Each of the rotated factors that follow represents a distinct subject matter, a more
specialized thread common to the response pattern for a smaller number of statements
that load high on the rotated factors.
This occurs because the first unrotated factor (the best linear explainer of the data)
may be located between independent clusters of associated variables. Rotating the factor
matrix removes this potential distortion and "matches" factors with distinct clusters of
data. See id. at 473-75. The Project's analysis employed varimax rotation, the most
widely used method of orthogonally shifting a factor matrix and the standard rotation
method of SPSS. Kim, supra note 194, at 485.
When the factor matrix is rotated, four distinct clusters of responses emerge. Six variables (Pt. III, Qs. 1, 3, 7, 12, 13, and 14) loaded acceptably high on Rotated Factor 1.
These variables are distinguished from the overall attitude variable, attorall, in that all
six of these questions deal solely with lawyers as persons rather than lawyers as a part
of the legal system. The questions used to compute this new variable, "attlaw," concerned
lawyers' trustworthiness; assessment of their own competence; promptness; fairness in
figuring fees; frankness and openness with clients; and attention to preventative counseling.
Six variables (Pt. III, Qs. 4, 5, 6, 18, 21, and 22) also load sufficiently high on Rotated
Factor 2. This group of questions seems to comprise a cluster of respondent attitudes
toward lawyers' conduct within the framework of the legal system rather than toward
lawyers' personal qualities. Labeled "lawsys," this variable resulted from questions concerning whether: most people who go to lawyers are troublemakers; the legal system is
concerned primarily with problems involving a large amount of money; lawyers adequately understand clients' desires; lawyers care about informing clients; attorneys work
harder at getting clients than serving them; lawyers needlessly complicate clients' problems.

Two questions (Pt. 111, Qs. 27 and 28) loaded very high on Rotated Factor 3. Actually,
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eral new scales on which to gauge respondents' perceptions of the legal
terrain and their effect on behavior. 196
the two questions asked respondents to agree or disagree with the same statement ("Most
lawyers would engage in unethical or illegal activities to help a client in an important
case."), but Question 27 requested respondents' current opinion whereas Question 28
asked how the respondent would have answered the question a year earlier. The survey,
conducted in late 1973 and early 1974, included the second question in an attempt to
measure the impact of the Watergate scandal on public attitudes toward lawyers' ethics.
Adding respondent scores on these questions produced a new attitude variable, "lawethic." The clustered variables forming lawethic suggest that the public holds a view of
the ethics of attorneys distinct from its view of the entire legal landscape.
A cluster of responses to four questions loading high on Rotated Factor 4 (Pt. III,
Qs. 2, 10, 19, and 23) focuses on judges and trials, indicating an overall public attitude
toward judges different from its attitudes regarding lawyers, their work, and the system.
In these four questions, respondents were asked whether judges: are generally selected
from among the most able lawyers; are honest and fair; give adequate time and attention to each case; as well as whether the respondent thought he could receive a fair
trial if accused of a crime. This variable, labeled "judtri," resulted from adding response
scores to these four questions.
In order to examine carefully the relationships among the attitude questions, a second factor analysis was performed. Those variables loading high on Factor I of the
initial factor analysis (the questions comprising attorall) were eliminated from this
second analysis in order that more subtle relationships in the data might be allowed to
emerge. The remaining 15 variables were factored. Three related questions (Pt. III, Qs.
4, 5, and 8) possessed high loadings upon a rotated factor in this second analysis. These
questions asked whether: people who go to lawyers are troublemakers; the legal system
tends to deal primarily with expensive problems; people should not call upon a lawyer
until exhausting other ways of dealing with a problem.
It appears that-regardless of their overall attitudes toward law, lawyers, judges, and
the legal system-people hold a distinct set of beliefs as to the appropriate circumstances
for using a lawyer. Knowing this enables the construction of a variable labeled "lawwhen"
to indicate a respondent's relative predisposition to use attorneys. Persons with high
lawwhen scores are more inclined to use lawyers when faced with a problem. Respondents
with low lawwhen scores are less likely to view consulting a lawyer as apt when faced
with the same problem.
196. The following tables show the distribution of scores for each variable (Parentheses
following each table contain average score per question used in constructing composite
variables.):
ArroRALL (OVERALL A'rrTUDa)

Score

Percent of Sample

13-28
29-33
34-37
38-40
41-43
44-46
47-49
50-52
53-56
57-65

9.9
9.3
10.7
10.8
10.2
10.1
9.4
9.1
9.7
10.8
100.0
N

Mean
4071
(3.3 per question)

43.1
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Ar-.TrAW

(ATTITUDE REGARDING LAWYERS' PERSONAL QUALITIES)

Score

Percent of Sample
22.9
29.5
21.7
25.9

6-17
18-21
22-24
25-30

100.0
N = 4071
Mean = 21.1
(3.51 per question)
LAwSYS

(ATTITUDE TOWARD THE LEGAL SYSTEM)

Score
6-18
19-23
24-26
27-30

Percent of Sample
22.5
30.3
22.2
25.0
100.0

N = 4071
Mean = 22.5
(3.75 per question)
JuDTRi (ATTITUDE REGARDING JUDGES AND

Score
4-11
12-13
14-15
16-17
18-20

TRIALS)

Percent of Sample
20.6
16.2
21.0
22.3
19.9
100.0

N = 4071
Mean = 14.3
(3.6 per question)
LAWETHIc (ATTITUDE ABOUT LAWYERS'

Score

ETHICS)

Percent of Sample

2-5
6-8
9-10

33.5
34.7
31.8
100.0
N = 4071
Mean = 6.8
(3.4 per question)

LAWWHEN (ATTITUDE ABOUT USING A LAWYER)

Score

Percent of Sample

3-8
9-10
11-12
13-14
15

20.7
15.3
26.7
21.8
15.5
100.0
N = 4071
Mean = 11.2
(3.7 per question)
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APPENDIX III
Demographic Profile of Users and Nonusers of Lawyers
Trait

Users

Nonusers

Sex .........................

46.6% male

38.8% male

R ace

91.8% white

87.4% white

46 mean yrs.

37 mean yrs.

A ge

.......................
........................

Number of Non-Acute Problems

518.5 mean
111.7 median

10.2 mean
5.2 median

Past Presence of an Acute
Problem ...................

32.1% of group

11.5% of group

Ownership of Real Property ..

82.4% of group

51.5% of group

Incom e .....................

$9,385 mean
$7,000 median

$7,927 mean
$6,781 median

Hodge-Siegel Occupation Status
Score .....................

40.6 mean

36.8 mean

Personal Direct Contact with a
Lawyer ...................

72.3% of group

52.3% of group

Past Use of Attorney for Own
Business ..................

6.2% of group

1.9% of group

29.7% of group

17.6% of group

Participant in Group that
Acted Collectively to Solve
Problem ...................
Awareness of Legal Implications

3.2 mean

2.9 mean

Overall Attitude Score ...

43.4 mean

42.6 mean

Lawwhen ...............

11.4 mean

11.0 mean

A ttlaw ..................

21.1 mean

21.0 mean

Lawsys ..................

22.7 mean

22.1 mean

Cost Estimate of Half-Hour
Consultation ..............

$30.49 mean
$25.19 median

$32.92 mean
$25.36 median

Cost Estimate of Simple Will ..

$79.47 mean
$50.20 median

$96.25 mean
$50.41 median
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